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Analyzing Vertical Mergers: Accounting for the
Unilateral Effects Tradeoff and Thinking Holistically
About Efficiencies
Roger D. Blair, Christine S. Wilson, D. Daniel Sokol, Keith Klovers & Jeremy A.
Sandford*
Introduction
Vertical mergers are once again a hot topic. Over the past several
years, commentators have vigorously debated whether the approach
traditionally taken by the US Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and US
Department of Justice Antitrust Division (“DOJ”) (collectively, the
“Agencies”) is fully aligned with economic thinking that is both au courant
and administrable. Recently, talk has turned to action: in the past three
years, DOJ litigated the first agency-led vertical merger challenge in
approximately forty years,1 the Agencies held the first public hearings on
vertical mergers in many years,2 and the Agencies issued new Vertical
Merger Guidelines, the first jointly issued agency guidance on the topic.3
In these discussions, some argue that vertical mergers pose at least the
same anticompetitive potential as their horizontal brethren, and therefore

* Roger D. Blair is the Huber Hurst Professor and Departmental Chair, Department of Economics, University of Florida. Christine S. Wilson serves as Commissioner, US Federal Trade Commission. D. Daniel Sokol is a Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law and Senior
Advisor, White & Case LLP. Keith Klovers is Of Counsel, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati LLP. Jeremy A. Sandford serves as Economic Advisor to Commissioner Wilson, US Federal Trade Commission.
The views expressed herein are our own and do not necessarily reflect the views of our institutions,
including the US Federal Trade Commission, or any other Commissioner.
1 See United States v. AT&T Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 193–94 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d, 916 F.3d 1029
(D.C. Cir. 2019).
2

See FTC Hearing #5: Vertical Merger Analysis and the Role of the Consumer Welfare Standard in
U.S. Antitrust Law, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Nov. 1, 2018), https://perma.cc/P7SW-3LWD; Public
Workshops on Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIV. (June 26, 2020),
https://perma.cc/2KV9-2TE3.
3 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES (2020),
https://perma.cc/389K-H8FP.
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deserve equal skepticism and scrutiny.4 Yet, this view is at odds with most
of the economic literature, which generally finds that vertical mergers
(and restraints) generate greater procompetitive benefits than horizontal
mergers, typically making them, on net, procompetitive. First and
foremost, vertical mergers allow the merged firm to eliminate a markup it
would otherwise pay a supplier; this dynamic is called the elimination of
double marginalization (“EDM”). Whereas EDM is an inherent or
unilateral effect, vertical mergers also produce a number of standard
efficiencies, like more efficiently allocating risk and incentivizing assetspecific investments, which benefit consumers by expanding output.
This is not to say that all vertical mergers and restraints are lawful.
Vertical mergers may also allow a firm to engage in anticompetitive
conduct, like raising rivals’ costs (“RRC”), complete foreclosure, or misuse
of information. Yet RRC and EDM are both inherent, unilateral
competitive effects—two sides of the same coin—even if they do not
necessarily share equal magnitude. As a result, the economic literature
finds that a vertical merger’s aggregate procompetitive benefits are likely
to exceed its anticompetitive effects across a wide range of—but not all—
possible scenarios.5
Yet the law has not always followed the economics, and sometimes
has explicitly parted ways with it. In the mid-twentieth century, the law
viewed efficiencies as either irrelevant or anticompetitive, and it therefore
condemned many vertical mergers.6 Of course, this was the same era when
comprehensive sectoral regulation was celebrated despite its destructive
consequences for consumers, the originally intended beneficiaries of
these byzantine legal frameworks.7

4

See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Nancy L. Rose, Steven C. Salop & Fiona Scott Morton, Five Principles for Vertical Merger Enforcement Policy, 33 ANTITRUST 12, 14 (2019) (“[E]nforcers also should not set
a higher evidentiary standard for finding anticompetitive harms from a vertical merger than it applies
when reviewing horizontal deals.”).
5

See, e.g., D. Bruce Hoffman, Acting Dir., Bureau of Competition, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks
on Vertical Merger Enforcement at the FTC at Credit Suisse 2018 Washington Perspectives Conference 4 (Jan. 10, 2018), https://perma.cc/W9TW-R5F6 (“To summarize, overall there is a broad consensus in competition policy and economic theory that the majority of vertical mergers are beneficial
because they reduce costs and increase the intensity of interbrand competition. That consensus has
support in the empirical research. Does that mean all vertical mergers are benign? No, it doesn’t.”).
6
7

See infra Section II.A.

See, e.g., Christine S. Wilson & Keith Klovers, The Growing Nostalgia for Past Regulatory Misadventures and the Risk of Repeating These Mistakes with Big Tech, 8 J. ANTITRUST ENF’T 10, 12–14 (2019)
(recounting the genesis and early history of the Interstate Commerce Commission and Civil Aeronautics Board).
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Ultimately the tide shifted with economic analysis leading the way.8
Year by year, the economic evidence has indicated ever more clearly that
vertical integration—whether by merger or otherwise—is typically
procompetitive.9 The shift towards economically informed legal analysis
profoundly affected the design of sector regulations, from transportation,
to banking, to energy. As a result, most sectoral regulations banning
vertical integration have fallen,10 as have other vertical restraints harmful
to consumer welfare.11
The recognition that vertical integration is typically procompetitive
also required a significant course correction in antitrust law and policy. In
the late 1970s, vertical mergers became more difficult to challenge.12 In
1984, the DOJ revised its Merger Guidelines to recognize that vertical
mergers “are less likely than horizontal mergers to create competitive
problems.”13 As a result, the Agencies and the parties resolved almost all
vertical merger concerns via consent agreements (“consents”),14 which

8 See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST
IMPLICATIONS (1975); Roger D. Blair & David L. Kaserman, A Note on Bilateral Monopoly and Formula
Price Contracts, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 460 (1987); Paul L. Joskow, The Role of Transaction Cost Economics
in Antitrust and Public Utility Regulatory Policies, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53 (1991); Benjamin Klein, Robert
G. Crawford & Armen A. Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297 (1978).
9 See infra Part I; see also Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, The Rule of Reason and the Goals of
Antitrust: An Economic Approach, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 471, 491 n.90 (2012) (noting that vertical integration through merger can lead to “increased competition”); Leah Brannon & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Antitrust Decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, 1967 to 2007, 3 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 3, 12 (2007) (same);
William E. Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking, 14 J.
ECON. PERSP. 43, 53 (2000) (same); D. Daniel Sokol, The Transformation of Vertical Restraints: Per Se
Illegality, the Rule of Reason, and Per Se Legality, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 1003, 1006 (2014) (same).
10

See Wilson & Klovers, supra note 7, at 10–12.

11

See SAM PELTZMAN & CLIFFORD WINSTON, DEREGULATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES (2000)
(describing the deregulation of various industries); Paul L. Joskow & Nancy L. Rose, The Effects of Economic Regulation, in 2 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1485 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert
Willig eds., 1989) (explaining how the deregulation of the airline industry since 1978 has improved
consumer welfare); Paul L. Joskow, Regulation and Deregulation After 25 Years: Lessons Learned for Research in Industrial Organization, 26 REV. INDUS. ORG. 169, 169–70, 188–89 (2005) (outlining the deregulation in various industries that began in the 1970s).
12

See infra Part II.

13

U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES 23 (1984), https://perma.cc/7WQF-ALW8.

14

See Steven C. Salop & Daniel P. Culley, Revising the US Vertical Merger Guidelines: Policy Issues
and an Interim Guide for Practitioners, 4 J. ANTITRUST ENF’T 1, 25 & n.80, 28 & n.92 (2015). Some consents may have been less effective. See Steven C. Salop, Invigorating Vertical Merger Enforcement, 127
YALE L.J. 1962, 1976, 1992 (2018). Antitrust agencies should take care to craft effective consents. For
remedying some of the limitations of existing consents, see, for example, Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Antitrust Div., Justice Department Will Move to Significantly Modify and Extend Consent
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ranged from the traditional to the quixotic,15 and in the handful of
remaining cases, the parties abandoned the merger. Indeed, it took almost
forty years for the Agencies to litigate another vertical merger challenge,
United States v. AT&T Inc.,16 and to issue new Vertical Merger Guidelines.
The Vertical Merger Guidelines acknowledge that “the agencies more
often encounter problematic horizontal mergers than problematic
vertical mergers”17 and describe an approach in which the Agencies will
balance the tradeoff of procompetitive effects of EDM with the harms
resulting from RRC. We call this the “unilateral effects tradeoff.”18
Given this economic and legal history, the best way for antitrust law
and policy to distinguish potentially anticompetitive vertical mergers
from potentially procompetitive or competitively benign ones is not, as
some populists have argued, to simply ban all such mergers.19 Rather,
following the approach set out by the D.C. Circuit in AT&T, policymakers
should create a series of presumptions, based on economic effects and a
careful case-by-case analysis using existing empirical tools (and
recalibrating those tools over time as economic learning advances),20 to
assess the likely economic effects of a given vertical merger. Although “the
lack of rules or even presumptions on vertical mergers” is untenable,21 it
makes little sense to reflexively “readopt”22 bygone legal rules that were
then, and even more surely are now, divorced from economic learning.
Decree with Live Nation/Ticketmaster (Dec. 19, 2019), https://perma.cc/JB8P-GE2N; Press Release,
Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Imposes Conditions on UnitedHealth Group’s Proposed Acquisition of
DaVita Medical Group (June 19, 2019), https://perma.cc/DFJ5-DXRX; Press Release, Fed. Trade
Comm’n, FTC Imposes Conditions on Northrop Grumman’s Acquisition of Solid Rocket Motor Supplier Orbital ATK, Inc. (June 5, 2018), https://perma.cc/CE8G-TKAJ.
15 See, e.g., Christine S. Wilson & Keith Klovers, Yes We Can, But Should We?: Merger Remedies
During the First Obama Administration, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L ANTITRUST CHRONICLE 2 (Dec. 2014).
16

310 F. Supp. 3d 161 (D.D.C. 2018).

17

DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 3, at 2.

18

Id. at 4–5 (describing how the Agencies will evaluate the “net effect” of EDM and RRC).

19

For example, Professor Lina Khan argues that “[t]he best way to preserve fair and open competition is . . . simply to completely ban any network monopolist from owning businesses that place it
in competition with the companies that depend on it to reach [the] market . . . [which] is what previous
generations did with railways.” Kevin Carty, Leah Douglas, Lina Khan & Matt Stoller, 6 Ideas to Rein in
Silicon Valley, Open Up the Internet, and Make Tech Work for Everyone, N.Y. MAG.: INTELLIGENCER (Dec.
11, 2017), https://perma.cc/XZ94-FS5H.
20

James Bernard, Rebecca Kirk Fair & D. Daniel Sokol, Why Does the Consumer Welfare Standard
Work? Matching Methods to Markets, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L ANTITRUST CHRON., Nov. 2019, at 1–7.
21 Open Markets Institute, American Economic Liberties Project, Frank Pasquale & Maurice
Stucke, Comment Letter on Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines, at 16 (Feb. 10, 2020),
https://perma.cc/CHC9-QWAE.
22

See id. at 1, 21–24 (urging readoption of the Department of Justice’s 1968 Merger Guidelines).
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Rather, policymakers should adopt and refine the burden-shifting
framework set out in United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc.23 and first applied
to vertical mergers in AT&T.24 Although this approach is generally
accepted, the discussion today on burden shifting misses two critical
refinements. First, because EDM and RRC are two sides of the same coin,
if a plaintiff alleges an RRC theory of harm, then it should bear the burden
(in step one) of demonstrating that the merger is likely to produce a net
unilateral anticompetitive effect. Such an approach is consistent with the
Vertical Merger Guidelines, which state that the Agencies will assess the
“net effect” of all changes to a merged firm’s unilateral incentives.25 In
litigation, this goal is achieved only if the analysis addresses both RRC and
EDM; specifically, the plaintiff must show that the anticompetitive effect
of RRC likely exceeds the procompetitive benefit of EDM in the instant
case—the unilateral effects tradeoff. The same logic also likely applies to
complete foreclosure, which is simply a more extreme form of RRC. This
approach should guide both judicial review and agency enforcement.
Second, if the plaintiff carries its burden at step one, then the
defendant should be able to argue, and courts and Agencies should
seriously consider, the full range of procompetitive efficiencies. As
economists have long known, vertical integration can expand output by
reducing transaction costs, better allocating risk, diffusing new
technologies and techniques, reducing inventory costs, and better
coordinating investment decisions. These efficiencies are real and should
be credited when proven. Given the state of the literature on the efficacy
of vertical contracting and the approach used in horizontal mergers,
defendants in these cases should not bear the burden of demonstrating
that every hypothetical alternative method of achieving these efficiencies
is closed to them. That is, antitrust needs to embrace a “holistic efficiency
analysis,” which incorporates this broader set of efficiencies that is well
recognized in the academic literature.
This Article is structured in three parts. Part I examines the economic
literature, both theoretic and empirical. Part II reviews the legal history,
starting with passage of the Clayton Act in 1914. Part III sets out the
proposed legal framework that synthesizes the economics and the law.

23

908 F.2d 981, 991–92 (D.C. Cir. 1990).

24

United States v. AT&T, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 191 (D.D.C. 2018).

25

DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 3, at 5.
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Economics of Vertical Mergers and Vertical Restraints

Vertical integration refers to a firm’s decision to operate at two (or
more) stages in the production and distribution of a product. For example,
suppose that a downstream retail grocery chain owned an upstream dairy
farm that produced raw milk,26 which it transferred to its retail outlets
after processing. The chain would be vertically integrated from the
production stage to the processing stage to the retail distribution stage.
A merger integrating two firms along the same vertical chain
incentivizes each formerly separate firm to account for the effect of its
actions on its merging partner. For example, an unintegrated retailer’s
profits may increase if a wholesaler decreases its price to that retailer. The
same retailer’s profits may also increase if the wholesaler raises its price to
the retailer’s competitors. Finally, the retailer’s price may affect the profit
earned by the wholesaler via sales to other retailers, as consumers
substitute across retailers based on price. Unintegrated firms ignore the
effect of their actions on the profits of other firms; integrated firms
optimally internalize how their actions affect their upstream and
downstream affiliates.
Horizontal merger enforcement is commonly premised on a single
analogous change to a unilateral incentive.27 A firm can increase the profit
of any other horizontally related firm by raising its price, thus diverting
some of its demand to that firm. Unintegrated firms ignore this external
effect, while integrated firms internalize the effect by increasing price to
the detriment of consumers. Antitrust scrutiny of horizontal mergers
often proceeds by measuring the effect of the unilateral incentive to
increase price against that of productive efficiencies generated by the
merger.
In contrast, vertical mergers generate a more complex set of unilateral
incentives, some of which typically benefit consumers and some of which
typically harm consumers. The net effect of these incentives is ambiguous
as a theoretical matter, meaning vertical mergers often benefit consumers
even in the absence of productive efficiencies. Accounting for both
26 In discussing the distribution chain from the initial production stage to the final consumer,
“downstream” refers to the move of goods towards the final consumer. Thus, when raw milk moves
from a dairy farm to a milk processor, it is moving downstream. Movements “upstream” are the opposite, that is, these movements are further away from the final consumer.
27

Coordinated theories of harm also exist for horizontal mergers. See, e.g., Nathan H. Miller &
Matthew C. Weinberg, Understanding the Price Effects of the MillerCoors Joint Venture, 85
ECONOMETRICA 1763, 1788–89 (2017). However, the focus in merger enforcement since the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines has been on unilateral effects.

2020]

Analyzing Vertical Mergers

767

unilateral incentives and productive efficiencies, the empirical literature
finds that vertical mergers usually benefit consumers. For example,
Professors Francine Lafontaine and Margaret Slade survey the empirical
literature and find that it “is highly supportive of the efficiency of vertical
integration and mergers . . . [and] indicates that integration benefits
consumers.”28 Two other surveys find similarly strong evidence that
vertical integration generally benefits consumers.29 In United States v.
AT&T, Inc., the district court was persuaded by evidence that three similar
past vertical mergers did not result in price increases.30
Determining prospectively whether a particular merger is likely to
harm or benefit consumers necessarily involves a weighing of
procompetitive and anticompetitive unilateral effects, even before
accounting for productive efficiencies. Horizontal mergers have widely
accepted indicia for likely unilateral harm.31 No such indicia exist for
vertical mergers. Evidence that anticompetitive effects are likely to be
large is unavailing if it is not analyzed concurrently with procompetitive
effects.32 Thus, while neither economic theory nor empirical evidence rule
out the possibility of harmful vertical mergers, both suggest that such

28

Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, Vertical Integration and Firm Boundaries: The Evidence,
45 J. ECON. LIT. 629, 675 (2007).
29 James C. Cooper, Luke M. Froeb, Dan O’Brien & Michael G. Vita, Vertical Antitrust Policy As a
Problem of Inference, 23 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 639, 658 (2005) (“Most studies find evidence that vertical
restraints/vertical integration are procompetitive . . . .”); Global Antitrust Institute, Comment Letter
on the Federal Trade Commission’s Hearings on Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st
Century, at 6–7 (Sept. 6, 2018), https://perma.cc/SDG2-PM3A (finding that, of eleven papers written
since 2008 identifying welfare implications of vertical integration, six found “positive welfare
changes; four [found] no change, a mixed change, or no economically meaningful change . . . and only
one (and perhaps two) had results that are consistent with a negative impact”). But see Marissa Beck &
Fiona Scott Morton, Evaluating the Evidence on Vertical Mergers (Feb. 26, 2020) (unpublished comment), https://perma.cc/GVZ6-X8NY (cautioning against strong inferences drawn from the vertical
merger retrospectives surveyed by Lafontaine & Slade, Cooper et al., and the Global Antitrust Institute).
30

See United States v. AT&T, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 215 (D.D.C. 2018).

31

See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 20
(2010) [hereinafter HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES], https://perma.cc/Q9HL-WNPV (“Unilateral
price effects are greater, the more the buyers of products sold by one merging firm consider products
sold by the other merging firm to be their next [best] choice.”).
32

See Gopal Das Varma & Martino De Stefano, Equilibrium Analysis of Vertical Mergers, 65
ANTITRUST BULL. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 2–3), https://perma.cc/DHA9-WE8J (“[W]e show
that RRC and EDM are not two separate effects. Instead, they are inseparably linked because the extent of EDM affects the strength of the RRC incentive, making EDM to be not just a stand-alone competitive benefit to be weighed against RRC.”).
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mergers may be difficult to distinguish from more common
procompetitive vertical mergers, outside of special circumstances.33
The remainder of this Section describes procompetitive effects
(including productive efficiencies) and anticompetitive effects of vertical
mergers in greater detail. It then discusses balancing the two effects and
the types of evidence that might support an inference of harm.
A. Procompetitive Effects of Vertical Integration
This Section discusses both a procompetitive unilateral effect—the
elimination of double marginalization—and procompetitive efficiencies.
EDM is an inherent result of a vertical merger that must be analyzed
concurrently with any anticompetitive unilateral effects. Some of the
efficiencies that may result from vertical mergers have close analogues to
those commonly resulting from horizontal mergers, while others may be
unique to vertical merger analysis. The breadth and likelihood of
productive efficiencies that may result from vertical mergers demands
that efficiencies be given serious attention before reaching a conclusion
that a vertical merger is likely to harm consumers. This Section addresses
primarily the circumstance in which vertical integration is achieved by
merger.
1.

Elimination of Double Marginalization

The literature on EDM traces back to Professor Joseph J. Spengler,
who recognized that upstream and downstream monopolists, operating
independently, price inefficiently because they choose their own markups
without reference to one another.34 When an upstream firm sells its
output, it will maximize profits by setting price above its marginal cost,
weighing the benefit of a higher margin against the reduction in demand
caused by a higher price. A downstream firm treats the upstream firm’s
price as part of its cost and imposes its own markup when it sells its own
output, for the same reason the upstream firm charges a markup. In effect,
there is a markup on a markup.
A vertical merger incentivizes the combined firm to eliminate the
double markup. Before merging, when the upstream firm sets its price, it
ignores that a decrease in its price raises the downstream firm’s profit and
instead maximizes only its own profit. After merging, the combined firm
33

See infra Section I.C.3.

34

See Joseph J. Spengler, Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy, 58 J. POL. ECON. 347, 349 (1950).
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internalizes the effect of the upstream price on downstream profit and
thus lowers the upstream price.
Indeed, the integrated firm optimally will lower the upstream markup
charged to the integrated downstream firm all the way to zero. Any
internal transfer price paid from the downstream firm to the upstream
firm neither increases nor decreases the combined firm’s overall profit.
Instead, the transfer price lowers the profit of the downstream firm but
increases the profit of the upstream firm by the same magnitude. Hence,
the upstream firm optimally sets its internal price to the downstream firm
to reflect the overall cost of the input to the firm.35
Because it considers the impact of its choices on its affiliate, the
merged firm earns a profit greater than the sum of the upstream and
downstream profits of the unintegrated firms. This merger also benefits
consumers: as the final good price falls, quantity rises, and both consumer
welfare and total welfare increase. These results can be illustrated with a
relatively simple economic model.
Figure 1

Suppose an upstream wholesale monopolist manufactures a product
while an independently owned and operated downstream retail

35

External factors, such as the tax code, may affect these transfer prices.
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monopolist sells the product at retail.36 In Figure 1, D represents the
demand for the final product as sold by the retailer and MR is the
associated marginal revenue. The marginal cost of performing the retail
function is MCR.
The retailer maximizes its profit by setting marginal revenue equal to
marginal cost. For the retailer, its marginal cost is the sum of the marginal
cost of retailing (“MCR”) and the wholesale price that the retailer pays to
the wholesaler. Thus, profit maximization requires purchasing and selling
that quantity where MR = MCR + w1. Rearranging the condition provides
the wholesaler’s derived demand: w1 = MR – MCR, which is labeled
d = MR – MCR in Figure 1. As one can see, d is parallel to MR; the vertical
distance between MR and d is the marginal cost of retailing, MCR. The
corresponding marginal revenue of d is mr.
The wholesaler optimally will produce where its marginal revenue
(“MR”) is equal to its marginal cost of production (“MCP”). The wholesale
price (“w1”) is found on the derived demand d at the profit-maximizing
quantity, which is Q1. Thus, the wholesaler produces Q1 and sells it to the
retailer at a price of w1. Its profit is equal to (w1 – MCP)Q1.
The retailer will maximize its profit by buying and reselling that
quantity where its marginal revenue (“MR”) is equal to its marginal cost,
which is w1 + MCR. As one can see in the figure, the profit maximizing
quantity is Q1 and the corresponding price is P1. The retailer’s profit is
(P1 – w1 – MCR)Q1.
As both the wholesaler and retailer set a price above marginal cost,
there is double marginalization. Were the wholesaler and retailer to
vertically integrate, the combined firm would maximize its profit by
equating the marginal revenue (“MR”) on sales of the final good to its total
marginal cost of production and retailing (MCP + MCR). The profit
maximizing quantity is Q2 and the corresponding price is P2. Thus,
integration causes the retail price to fall from P1 to P2 and the quantity sold
increases from Q1 to Q2. Under vertical integration, the combined firm sets
a single markup over its combined cost of production and retailing, MCP +
MCR.
EDM results when the merged firm internalizes the negative pricing
externality that its upstream price has on its downstream margin;
therefore, EDM is likely to result from any vertical merger for which this
type of externality exists. Consequently, this phenomenon will arise in any

36 EDM is illustrated using successive monopolists to abstract away from other unilateral effects
that would result from a vertical merger of oligopolists. Our EDM analysis would extend to this case
unaltered.
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vertical merger in which the downstream firm is a current customer of the
upstream firm and pays a markup over the upstream firm’s costs. It will
also arise in vertical mergers involving a downstream firm that does not
currently purchase from the upstream firm but would likely do so after
integration. Indeed, EDM may even arise in vertical mergers in which the
downstream firm is unlikely to purchase from the upstream firm after
integration, if the merger would improve the bargaining position of the
downstream firm when negotiating with its unintegrated supplier.
Although EDM is a common phenomenon in vertical mergers, it is
not always present. For example, EDM may not occur if the upstream
firm’s product is technologically incompatible with the downstream firm’s
needs. Similarly, if an already vertically integrated firm acquires an
upstream rival, there may be no double margin to eliminate. Finally, if
unintegrated firms have been able to completely eliminate double
margins via contract, then their merger would, by definition, not result in
EDM (although the mere possibility of achieving EDM via contract should
not meaningfully alter analysis of EDM in any particular merger37).
There is some debate about the frequency of the specialized
circumstances described in the previous paragraph. For example,
Professors Jonathan Baker, Nancy Rose, Steven Salop, and Fiona Scott
Morton noted that “common assumptions that EDM merger benefits are
inevitable . . . and that EDM can be presumed to be merger-specific” are
not supported by economic reasoning.38 American Antitrust Institute
President Diana Moss suggests “[t]here is a well-established case for
caution regarding EDM, which is rooted in the restrictive assumptions
underlying the theory.”39
Contrary to these assertions, a vertical merger is likely to result in
EDM if the cost to the upstream firm of supplying an input to the
downstream firm (i.e., exclusive of markup) is less than the cost to the
downstream firm of acquiring the same input from an unintegrated firm.
Since an unintegrated firm typically will charge a markup above its costs,
this condition will generally apply. While some types of contracts, such as
two-part tariffs, can mitigate the double marginalization problem outside
of vertical integration,40 there is no evidence that firms that have not
already implemented such contracts are likely to be able to fully eliminate
37

See infra Section I.A.3.

38

Jonathan B. Baker, Nancy L. Rose, Steven C. Salop & Fiona Scott Morton, Comments Letter
on the Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines, at 31 (Feb. 24, 2020), https://perma.cc/W9MN-X3W9.
39 American Antitrust Institute, Comment Letter on Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines, at 10
(Feb. 25, 2020), https://perma.cc/LNQ6-8UX9.
40

See infra Section I.A.3.
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the double margin by changing contracting practices.41 In fact, the
empirical literature supports the contrary conclusion—namely, that
vertical integration via contract is an imperfect substitute for vertical
integration via merger.42 The Vertical Merger Guidelines endorse this
perspective in noting that “[t]he Agencies do not, however, reject the
merger specificity of the elimination of double marginalization solely
because it could theoretically be achieved but for the merger.”43
Most retrospective studies find that vertical integration benefitted
consumers, and few show harmful effects.44 Merger retrospectives often
measure the performance of merged firms against a set of similarly
situated control firms. Such studies may be limited to observing the
overall effects of a vertical merger on merging firms and may be unable to
distinguish between various procompetitive and anticompetitive effects.45
Nonetheless, the literature suggests that EDM is very likely to contribute
significantly to the procompetitive effects of most vertical mergers.46

41

See Daniel P. O’Brien, The Antitrust Treatment of Vertical Restraints: Beyond the Possibility Theorems, in SWEDISH COMPETITION AUTHORITY, THE PROS AND CONS OF VERTICAL RESTRAINTS 40, 63
(2008) (“The use of nonlinear contracts can mitigate double-marginalization, but it does not necessarily eliminate it.”).
42

See United States v. AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d 1029, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (describing EDM likely to
result from the merger); Gregory S. Crawford, Robin S. Lee, Michael D. Whinston & Ali Yurukoglu,
The Welfare Effects of Vertical Integration in Multichannel Television Markets, 86 ECONOMETRICA 891,
893–94 (2018) (finding substantial savings from integration in the cable industry); Lafontaine & Slade,
supra note 28, at 649 (summarizing strong empirical support for inefficiencies associated with contracting); see also discussion of the GM/Fisher merger infra Part III.
43

DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 3, at 12.

44

See Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, Franchising and Exclusive Distribution: Adaptation
and Antitrust, in II OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 387 (Roger D. Blair
& D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2014) (providing a literature review); LaFontaine & Slade, supra note 28, at 677
(“[O]verall a fairly clear empirical picture emerges. The data appear to be telling us that efficiency
considerations overwhelm anticompetitive motives in most contexts. Furthermore, even when we
limit attention to natural monopolies or tight oligopolies, the evidence of anticompetitive harm is not
strong.”).
45 But see Fernando Luco & Guillermo Marshall, The Competitive Impact of Vertical Integration by
Multiproduct Firms, 110 AM. ECON. REV. 2041, 2043 (2020) (measuring separately the effects of vertical
integration on integrated and nonintegrated firms, finding unintegrated products increased in price
by 1.2 to 1.5 percent, while prices for integrated products decreased by 0.8 to 1.2 percent).
46 See Cooper et al., supra note 29, at 648 (surveying twenty-two empirical papers, which “appear
to provide strong support for the proposition that vertical integration/vertical restraints often help
solve double markup problems”); Crawford et al., supra note 42, at 893–94 (describing an estimated
structural model of the cable industry allowing a finding that “$0.79 of each dollar of profit realized
by its integrated partner is internalized . . . when integrated MVPDs and RSNs bargain with each
other” and that the overall effect of vertical integration, even in the absence of program access rules,
“is to increase consumer and total welfare”); Panos Kouvelis, Drug Pricing for Competing
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EDM benefits are likely to be largest when the upstream firm, prior
to the merger, charges a large markup to the downstream firm it
acquires.47 Benefits may be smaller if the merging firms already engage in
some form of nonlinear contracting, or if the upstream firm is capacity
constrained.
In summary, unlike horizontal mergers, vertical mergers induce a
procompetitive unilateral effect in addition to any such anticompetitive
effects and in addition to procompetitive productive efficiencies.
2.

Efficiencies

Often commentary on the procompetitive effects of vertical mergers
focuses on EDM. Though EDM is important, there are many other
potential procompetitive effects that should be considered. These
efficiencies play a role in both vertical mergers and mergers of
complementary or adjacent products.48 These efficiencies, while real both
in terms of theory and empirics, often are not developed by the parties or
credited by the Agencies. This “chicken and egg” problem hinders
substantive development of efficiency arguments, both in litigation and
during the Agencies’ merger review process.49
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Distributing Through a Common PBM, 27 PROD. OPER. MGMT. 3799
(2018) (finding “when the price sensitivity of the PBM’s market size is sufficiently small, unless the
vertical integration is associated with a sufficient increase in the market base, social welfare decreases
after the integration due to the profit loss from the non‐integrated branded drug manufacturers.
When the price sensitivity of the PBM’s market size is relatively large, the elimination of double marginalization benefits plan enrollees and significantly expands the PBM’s price‐driven market size,
which leads to a higher social welfare in the post‐integration model”); Gunther Glenk & Stefan
Reichelstein, Synergistic Value in Vertically Integrated Power‐to‐Gas Energy Systems, 29 PROD. OPER.
MGMT. 526, 526–28 (2020) (identifying vertical integration effectiveness in electric energy); Ricard Gil,
Does Vertical Integration Decrease Prices? Evidence from the Paramount Antitrust Case of 1948, 7 AMER.
ECON. J. 162 (2015). On the limits of the assumptions on EDM see John Kwoka & Margaret Slade, Second Thoughts on Double Marginalization, ANTITRUST MAG., Spring 2020, at 51; Jaideep Shenoy, An Examination of the Efficiency, Foreclosure, and Collusion Rationales for Vertical Takeovers, 58 MGMT SCI.
1482, 1500 (2012) (“Collectively, our findings indicate that firms use corporate takeovers to expand
their vertical boundaries consistent with an efficiency improvement rationale as predicted by the
transaction cost economics and property rights theories.”).
47

See infra note 68 and accompanying text.

48

See, e.g., Annabelle Gawer & Rebecca Henderson, Platform Owner Entry and Innovation in
Complementary Markets: Evidence from Intel, 16 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 1 (2007); Zhuoxin Li &
Ashish Agarwal, Platform Integration and Demand Spillovers in Complementary Markets: Evidence from
Facebook’s Integration of Instagram, 63 MGMT. SCI. 3438 (2017).
49 See Christine S. Wilson, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks on Breaking the Vicious Cycle: Establishing a Gold Standard for Efficiencies at Bates White Antitrust Webinar (June 24, 2020),
https://perma.cc/88HA-K25L.

774

George Mason Law Review

a.

[Vol. 27:3

Reduction of Transaction Costs

Related to but distinct from EDM is the reduction of transaction costs
through merger.50 Transaction costs explain why certain firms vertically
integrate via merger rather than through contracts (markets).51 Nobel
laureate Oliver Williamson defined a transaction as an event “when a good
or service is transferred across a technologically separable interface. One
stage of [processing or assembly] activity terminates and another begins.”52
Thus, there is a choice of “make” or “buy” to reduce transaction costs.53
The conditions under which transaction costs occur will vary with the
particular governance mechanism used for a given transaction’s economic
consequence.54 Those organizations that can reduce transaction costs are
more likely to create more value for themselves.
The theory that vertical integration may beneficially eliminate
transaction costs first emerged in the 1970s, although its origins belong to
Professor Ronald Coase.55 Empirical literature followed,56 as did literature
50 For EDM reviews outside of economics, see, for example, Gérard. P. Cachon & Patrick T.
Harker, Competition and Outsourcing with Scale Economies, 48 MGMT. SCI. 1314 (2002).
51

See Mikko Ketokivi & Joseph T. Mahoney, Transaction Cost Economics As a Theory of Supply
Chain Efficiency, 29 PROD. & OPERATIONS MGMT. 1011, 1011 (2020) (“TCE [is] one of the most cited and
applied organization theories in operations and supply chain management research . . . .”); see also
Andy A. Tsay, John V. Gray, In Joon Noh & Joseph T. Mahoney, A Review of Production and Operations
Management Research on Outsourcing in Supply Chains: Implications for the Theory of the Firm, 27 PROD.
& OPERATIONS MGMT. 1177, 1179–80 (2018).
52

Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach, 87 AM.
J. SOC. 548, 552 (1981).
53 See Soon Ang & Detmar W. Straub, Production and Transaction Economies and IS Outsourcing:
A Study of the U.S. Banking Industry, 22 MIS Q. 535, 537 (1998); Michael J. Leiblein & Douglas J. Miller,
An Empirical Examination of Transaction and Firm-Level Influences on the Vertical Boundaries of the Firm,
24 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 839, 848 (2003). Of course, a firm can pursue both strategies. See Anne Parmigiani, Why Do Firms Both Make and Buy? An Investigation of Concurrent Sourcing, 28 STRATEGIC MGMT.
J. 285, 285 (2007).
54

See WILLIAMSON, supra note 8.

55

See Oliver E. Williamson, Vertical Integration, in 4 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS 807, 809 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987) (“Although this [TCE] conception of the firm-asgovernance-structure was first advanced fifty years ago (Coase, 1937), it lacked operationality and languished for most of the next thirty-five years (Coase, 1972). The past fifteen years [1972–1987], by contrast, have witnessed renewed attention to and operational headway on transaction cost matters.”).
See generally WILLIAMSON, supra note 8; R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937);
Paul Joskow, Vertical Integration and Long-term Contracts: The Case of Coal-burning Electric Generating
Plants, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 33 (1985); Klein et al., supra note 8; Oliver E. Williamson, The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 112 (1971).
56 See, e.g., Jeffery T. Macher & Barak D. Richman, Transaction Cost Economics: An Assessment of
Empirical Research in the Social Sciences, 10 BUS. & POL. 1 (2008); Scott E. Masten, Reaffirming
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focused on antitrust-related issues.57 This literature identified that, under
certain circumstances, vertical integration could eliminate transaction
costs (particularly by addressing issues of specificity, uncertainty, and
complexity) and thereby increase consumer welfare.58
The premise behind the reduction of transaction costs through
merger is that such integration is needed under a particular set of
circumstances. Assume that assets are cospecialized. The more
cospecialized the asset, the greater the need to have vertical integration.
The more that a firm outsources cospecialized investments, the greater
the likelihood of higher transaction costs due to holdup.59 The possibility
of such holdup may be factored into the pricing of contracts across firms
or may cause a vertical partner to be chilled from making cospecialized
investments. In contrast, outsourcing is more likely when transaction
costs are lower.60
b.

Reduction of Asymmetric Risk

Vertical integration is a way to manage and mitigate risk, which may
be asymmetric due to contractual incompleteness.61 Asymmetric risk also

Relationship-Specific Investments: Comments on Miwa and Ramseyer’s ‘Rethinking Relationship-Specific
Investments’, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2668, 2675 (2000) (“The empirical literature examining the determinants of organizational form and contract design is extensive, certainly far too large to review here.
Suffice it to say, surveys of the literature have all come to virtually the same conclusion, namely, that
transaction-cost economics has been profoundly successful empirically.”); Howard A. Shelanski & Peter G. Klein, Empirical Research in Transaction Cost Economics: A Review and Assessment, 11 J. L. ECON.
& ORG. 335 (1995).
57

See, e.g., Lafontaine & Slade, supra note 28; Alan J. Meese, Robert Bork’s Forgotten Role in the
Transaction Cost Revolution, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 953, 960–61 (2014) (providing an overview). For an empirical review, see infra note 227 (discussing the factors considered in determining vertical merger
policy).
58 See Lafontaine & Slade, supra note 28, at 649 (summarizing literature on transaction costs
models).
59

See Nicholas Argyres, Joseph T. Mahoney & Jackson Nickerson, Strategic Responses to Shocks:
Comparative Adjustment Costs, Transaction Costs, and Opportunity Costs, 40 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 357,
365 (2019).
60 There are of course hybrid organizational forms as well. See, e.g., Janet E.L. Bercovitz, The
Option to Expand: The Use of Multi-Unit Opportunities to Support Self-Enforcing Agreements in Franchise
Relationships, 1 ACAD. MGMT. PROC. Y1 (2002); Bryan Borys & David B. Jemison, Hybrid Arrangements
As Strategic Alliances: Theoretical Issues in Organizational Combinations, 14 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 234, 235
(1989).
61 See Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of
Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691, 717 (1986); Oliver D. Hart & John Moore, Property
Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119, 1120 (1990).
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impacts the possibility of holdup or contractual renegotiation.62 Due to
the incompleteness of contracts, one party may be more risk averse with
respect to contracting than the other. This risk is inherent in the supply
chain process and is exacerbated by varying levels of ownership. Vertical
integration by merger solves these asymmetric risk problems.63
The risk uncertainty of a manufacturer may affect how it distributes
its product downstream.64 The chosen options will differ based on a firm’s
resources and strategy. Some firms may use distributors, an approach that
creates various risks like principal-agent problems. Firms averse to these
risks may want to mitigate them by vertically integrating forward.
Financial vertical integration may improve a firm’s ability to achieve sales
targets or to reap the rewards of promotional activities.65 Thus,
downstream integration offers more control for a manufacturer over
marketing practices, and increased control reduces uncertainty.
c.

Learning-by-Doing

A knowledge‐based view of the firm, a view used in the management
literature, stresses the role that knowledge plays in firm performance.
Knowledge develops via learning-by-doing—an approach based on
experiential learning within the firm.66 If used effectively, learning-bydoing improves firm outcomes.67 Organizational design plays a role in
62

See George Baker, Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, Informal Authority in Organizations, 15
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 56, 59 (1999); Eric Maskin & John Moore, Implementation and Renegotiation, 66 REV.
ECON. STUD. 39, 52 (1999); Ilya Segal & Michael D. Whinston, The Mirrlees Approach to Mechanism
Design with Renegotiation (With Applications to Hold-Up and Risk Sharing), 70 ECONOMETRICA 1, 1
(2002).
63

See René Aïd, Gilles Chemla, Arnaud Prochet & Nizar Touzi, Hedging and Vertical Integration
in Electricity Markets, 57 MGMT. SCI. 1438, 1449–50 (2011) (discussing reduction of asymmetric risk).
64 See V. Kasturi Rangan, E. Raymond Corey & Frank Cespedes, Transaction Cost Theory: Inferences from Clinical Field Research on Downstream Vertical Integration, 4 ORG. SCI. 454, 454 (1993)
(“[C]hannel investments are influenced by a firm’s uncertainty absorption mechanism . . . .”).
65

See Wei Guan & Jakob Rehme, Vertical Integration in Supply Chains: Driving Forces and Consequences for a Manufacturer’s Downstream Integration, 17 SUPPLY CHAIN MGMT. 187, 189 (2012); George
John & Barton A. Weitz, Forward Integration into Distribution: An Empirical Test of Transaction Cost
Analysis, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 337, 341 (1988).
66 See, e.g., LINDA ARGOTE, ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING: CREATING, RETAINING AND
TRANSFERRING KNOWLEDGE 38 (2d ed. 2013); Olav Sorenson, Interdependence and Adaptability: Organizational Learning and the Long-Term Effect of Integration, 49 MGMT. SCI. 446, 446 (2003) (discussing
“learning by doing” based on asset specificity).
67 See Will Mitchell, J. Myles Shaver & Bernard Yeung, Foreign Entrant Survival and Foreign Market
Share: Canadian Companies’ Experience in United States Medical Sector Markets, 15 STRATEGIC MGMT. J.
555, 565 (1994).
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these outcomes. Firms with greater internal knowledge can benefit from
greater vertical integration because of this increased knowledge.68
The intuition is that the more specialized a firm becomes, the more
constrained it is in its ability to coordinate effectively across different
interdependent stages of production in a supply chain.69 In this context,
something short of integration—like a joint venture that is vertical in
nature70 or perhaps a strategic alliance—may be less efficient than vertical
integration. In these settings, vertical integration is superior because
extensive knowledge sharing and the coordination of interdependent
tasks enabled by higher levels of internal knowledge enable the extraction
of greater benefits.71
d.

Knowledge Transfers

Vertical mergers also may generate efficiencies by facilitating the
transfer of knowledge.72 Knowledge-based hierarchies are increasingly

68

See Rebecca Henderson & Ian Cockburn, Scale, Scope, and Spillovers: The Determinants of Research Productivity in Drug Discovery, 27 RAND J. ECON. 32, 33 (1996); Jeffrey T. Macher & Christopher
Boerner, Technological Development at the Boundaries of the Firm: A Knowledge‐Based Examination in
Drug Development, 33 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1016, 1032 (2012) (“Holding firm experience constant, insourcing fosters control and facilitates communication in ways that outsourcing has difficulty matching.”); Jeffrey T. Macher, Technological Development and the Boundaries of the Firm: A Knowledge-Based
Examination in Semiconductor Manufacturing, 52 MGMT. SCI. 826, 832 (2006).
69 See David J. Teece, Firm Organization, Industrial Structure, and Technological Innovation, 31 J.
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 193, 222 (1996) (identifying “firm organization . . . [as] an important determinant
of innovation”).
70

See JOHN ALAN STUCKEY, VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND JOINT VENTURES IN THE ALUMINUM
INDUSTRY 149 (1983) (explaining a joint venture consists of “two or more separate groups [that] jointly
participate as co-owners of a producing organization” while “each joint venturer continues to exist as
. . . independent of the joint-venture firm”).
71 See Rahul Kapoor, Persistence of Integration in the Face of Specialization: How Firms Navigated
the Winds of Disintegration and Shaped the Architecture of the Semiconductor Industry, 24 ORG. SCI. 1195,
1198 (2013).
72

See Fredrik Tell, Knowledge Integration and Innovation: A Survey of the Field, in KNOWLEDGE
INTEGRATION AND INNOVATION: CRITICAL CHALLENGES FACING INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY-BASED
FIRMS 20 (Christian Berggren et al. eds., 2011); Enghin Atalay, Ali Hortaçsu & Chad Syverson, Vertical
Integration and Input Flows, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 1120, 1146 (2014); Robert M. Grant, Prospering in Dynamically-Competitive Environments: Organizational Capability as Knowledge Integration, 7 ORG. SCI.
375, 380 (1996); Gabriel Natividad, Integration and Productivity: Satellite-Tracked Evidence, 60 MGMT.
SCI. 1698, 1717 (2014); Zheng Jane Zhao & Jaideep Anand, A Multilevel Perspective on Knowledge Transfer:
Evidence From the Chinese Automotive Industry, 30 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 959 (2009).
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understood to add value to firms.73 A number of theoretical papers argue
that hierarchies require the integration of knowledge to be effective.74
Within an organizational setting, the firm must acquire, gather, and
process information.75 This body of work suggests that an acquisition is
valuable only if the acquirer can internalize and integrate the knowledge
of the target.76
The ability to direct knowledge transfer depends on both intensity
and location of the knowledge transfer. Knowledge creation and transfer
will work differently if outsourced outside the firm or if undertaken
within the firm.77 Within the firm, knowledge transfer requires a different
orientation, and it may be more difficult to replicate this set of
relationships across organizations.
e.

Reduction of Information Leakage Due to the Use of Trade
Secrets

Firms may be unwilling to coordinate fully with upstream or
downstream partners because of potential information leakage to
competitors or would-be competitors. With vertical integration via
merger, a firm need not be as concerned with information leakage and the

73 See Luis Garicano, Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production, 108 J. POL.
ECON. 874, 875–76 (2000); Raaj K. Sah & Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Quality of Managers in Centralized Versus
Decentralized Organizations, 106 Q.J. ECON. 289, 289 (1991).
74

See, e.g., Yanhui Wu, Organizational Structure and Product Choice in Knowledge-Intensive Firms,
61 MGMT. SCI. 1830 (2015).
75

See Masahiko Aoki, The Contingent Governance of Teams: Analysis of Institutional Complementarity, 35 INT’L ECON. REV. 657, 658–60 (1994); Patrick Bolton & Mathias Dewatripont, The Firm as a
Communication Network, 109 Q.J. ECON. 809, 809 (1994); Garicano, supra note 73, at 874; Timothy Van
Zandt, Real-Time Decentralized Information Processing as a Model of Organizations with Boundedly Rational Agents, 66 REV. ECON. STUD. 633, 633 (1999); Wu, supra note 74; Kevin Zheng Zhou & Caroline
Bingxin Li, How Knowledge Affects Radical Innovation: Knowledge Base, Market Knowledge Acquisition,
and Internal Knowledge Sharing, 33 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1090, 1092 (2012).
76 See Bruno Cassiman, Massimo G. Colombo, Paola Garrone & Reinhilde Veugelers, The Impact
of M&A on the R&D Process: An Empirical Analysis of the Role of Technological- and Market-Relatedness,
34 RES. POL’Y 195, 198 (2005); Marianna Makri, Michael A. Hitt & Peter J. Lane, Complementary Technologies, Knowledge Relatedness, and Invention Outcomes in High Technology Mergers and Acquisitions,
31 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 602, 603 (2010).
77 See generally GEORGE VON KROGH, KAZUO ICHIJO & IKUJIRO NONAKA, ENABLING KNOWLEDGE
CREATION: HOW TO UNLOCK THE MYSTERY OF TACIT KNOWLEDGE AND RELEASE THE POWER OF
INNOVATION (2000); Riikka Mirja Sarala, Paulina Junni, Cary L. Cooper & Shlomo Yedidia Tarba, A
Sociocultural Perspective on Knowledge Transfer in Mergers and Acquisitions, 42 J. MGMT. 1230 (2016);
Henrik Bresman, Julian Birkinshaw & Robert Nobel, Knowledge Transfer in International Acquisitions,
41 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 5 (2010).
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loss of trade secrets. For this reason, vertical mergers may boost firm
productivity with regard to critical high value products and processes.78
f.

Reducing Inventory Costs

Inventory costs can be an important driver of total costs.79 Vertical
integration may facilitate faster optimization and control over inventory,80
and it also may reduce forecast bias.81 Empirical work suggests that vertical
integration can improve operational performance through better
inventory scheduling.82 Certainly some firms—like Walmart, Amazon, and
Toyota—are very effective in creating complex supply chains for just-intime delivery. However, other firms are less effective at creating a lean
supply chain system. For these other firms, the use of an internal transport
hub for both production and logistics would make inventory scheduling
easier.83 Indeed, internalization of the coordination functions may
improve information flow or create efficiencies due to technological
interdependencies in the production process.84
Information sharing across firms in a supply chain may be valuable to
reduce inventory costs and other related inefficiencies.85 However,
effective sharing must include effective management and coordination
across information technology (“IT”) infrastructures.86 The more difficult

78

See Sharon Novak & Scott Stern, Complementarity Among Vertical Integration Decisions: Evidence from Automobile Product Development, 55 MGMT. SCI. 311, 312 (2009).
79

See Timothy F. Bresnahan & Peter C. Reiss, Dealer and Manufacturer Margins, 16 RAND J.
ECON. 253, 264 (1985).
80 See Diane J. Reyniers, The Effect of Vertical Integration on Consumer Price in the Presence of Inventory Costs, 130 EUR. J. OPERATIONAL RES. 83, 88 (2001) (discussing how vertical integration may reduce inventory costs).
81

See Xiang Wan & Nadia R. Sanders, The Negative Impact of Product Variety: Forecast Bias, Inventory Levels, and the Role of Vertical Integration, 186 INT’L J. PROD. ECON. 123, 123–24 (2017).
82

See Hong Chen, Murray Z. Frank & Owen Q. Wu, What Actually Happened to the Inventories of
American Companies Between 1981 and 2000?, 51 MGMT. SCI. 1015, 1015–17 (2005); John Stuckey & David
White, When and When Not to Vertically Integrate, 34 SLOAN MGMT. REV. 71 (1993).
83 See Richard A. D’Aveni & David J. Ravenscraft, Economies of Integration versus Bureaucracy
Costs: Does Vertical Integration Improve Performance?, 37 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1167, 1170 (1994).
84

See Abbie Griffin & John R. Hauser, Patterns of Communication Among Marketing, Engineering,
and Manufacturing—A Comparison Between Two Product Teams, 38 MGMT. SCI. 360 (1992).
85

See Hau L. Lee, Kut C. So & Christopher S. Tang, The Value of Information Sharing in a TwoLevel Supply Chain, 46 MGMT. SCI. 626, 627 (2000).
86 See Henk Akkermans, Paul Bogerd, Enver Yücesan & Luk N. van Wassenhove, The Impact of
ERP on Supply Chain Management: Exploratory Findings From a European Delphi Study, 146 EUR. J.
OPERATIONAL RES. 284, 300 (2003); Eric K. Clemons & Bruce W. Weber, London’s Big Bang: A Case
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it is to address disparate IT infrastructures, the more difficult it may be to
achieve efficiencies in inventory management. These effects vary by firm
IT due to the specific assets within a given firm. With the right set of
assets, vertical integration—when a single firm has a more unified IT
infrastructure—is efficient.87 Thus, the effective use of IT infrastructure
within the same firm allows for reallocating excess IT-related capacity
within other units of the firm to reduce inventory and other costs.88
g.

Research and Development and Innovation-Related Synergies

One driver of vertical mergers may be research and development
synergies. A series of finance papers suggests that complementary assets
create efficiencies for merged firms.89 This literature is premised on the
important underlying assumption that contractual integration short of a
merger—through a strategic alliance, bilateral contracting, or corporate
venture capital—is insufficient to achieve such efficiencies.
The nature of knowledge transfer within a firm’s boundaries partly
explains why acquisitions and contractual arrangements accomplish
different results.90 For example, in a study on the pharmaceutical industry,
internal knowledge coupled with external acquisition led to greater

Study of Information Technology, Competitive Impact, and Organizational Change, 6 J. MGMT. INFO. SYS.
41, 46–47 (1990).
87 See Gautam Ray, Ling Xue & Jay B. Barney, Impact of Information Technology Capital on Firm
Scope and Performance: The Role of Asset Characteristics, 56 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1125, 1142 (2013) (noting
that “in firms with narrowly valuable assets, the electronic brokerage effect of IT capital is likely to
dominate, and IT capital is likely to facilitate more vertical and product-market specialization, in ways
that are consistent with transaction cost economics; and in firms with broadly valuable assets, the
electronic integration effect of IT capital is likely to dominate, and IT capital is likely to facilitate more
vertical integration and product-market diversification, in ways that are consistent with the resourcebased view”).
88 See Hüseyin Tanriverdi, Performance Effects of Information Technology Synergies in Multibusiness Firms, 30 MIS Q. 57, 58 (2006).
89 See Jan Bena & Kai Li, Corporate Innovations and Mergers and Acquisitions, 69 J. FIN. 1923, 1955
(2014); Matthew J. Higgins & Daniel Rodriguez, The Outsourcing of R&D Through Acquisition in the
Pharmaceutical Industry, 80 J. FIN. ECON. 351, 381 (2006); Gerard Hoberg & Gordon M. Phillips, Product
Market Synergies and Competition in Mergers and Acquisitions: A Text-Based Analysis, 23 REV. FIN. STUD.
3773, 3808 (2010); Simi Kedia, S. Abraham Ravid & Vincente Pons, When Do Vertical Mergers Create
Value?, 40 FIN. MGMT. 845, 872 (2011); Gordon M. Phillips & Alexei Zhdanov, R&D and the Incentives
from Merger and Acquisition Activity, 26 REV. FIN. STUD. 34, 71–72 (2013).
90

See DAVID J. TEECE, DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES AND STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: ORGANIZING FOR
INNOVATION AND GROWTH 171 (2009); Henry W. Chesbrough & David J. Teece, When Is Virtual Virtuous? Organizing for Innovation, 74 HARV. BUS. REV. 65 (1996); David J. Teece, Gary Pisano & Amy Shuen,
Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic Management, 18 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 509 (1997).
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consumer welfare.91 Similarly, technological relatedness creates increased
efficiencies.92
We recognize that not all mergers lead to the anticipated efficiencies.
As one article summarizes:
Building a new competitive capability via technology acquisitions is a multi-stage process
in which the acquisition itself is simply the first step. Acquiring firms obtain valuable
knowledge through acquisitions of target firms. Then, they must utilize the acquired
knowledge for their subsequent services or products. Otherwise, the acquired knowledge
is simply hoarded within the acquiring firms, and they fail to actualize the value of the
93
acquired knowledge.

Overall, firm cultures differ, and the agility of startups is not always
present in large firms.
h.

Investment Coordination

Lack of information sharing creates the potential for a lack of
coordination within a supply chain.94 Investment coordination within a
firm is a way to solve this information problem and may justify vertical
integration.95 Coordination risk stems from the fact that an individual
firm’s decisions contribute to a collective vertical outcome. Because those
91

See John Hagedoorn & Ning Wang, Is There Complementarity or Substitutability Between Internal and External R&D Strategies?, 41 RES. POL’Y 1072, 1073 (2012) (“[I]nternal R&D and external R&D,
through either R&D alliances or R&D acquisitions, are complementary innovation activities at higher
levels of in-house R&D investments, whereas at lower levels of in-house R&D efforts, internal and
external R&D turn out to be substitutive strategic options.”); Jaideep C. Prabhu, Rajesh K. Chandy &
Mark E. Ellis, The Impact of Acquisitions on Innovation: Poison Pill, Placebo, or Tonic?, 69 J. MKTG. 114,
126–27 (2005) (“Acquisitions provide a means to access external knowledge that can be difficult or
even impossible to create through internal sources.”). But see Colleen Cunningham, Florian Ederer &
Song Ma, Killer Acquisitions 1–3 (April 22, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://perma.cc/RUU8LH6N (identifying mechanisms by which mergers might kill off potential competitors in the pharmaceutical industry).
92 See Gautam Ahuja & Riitta Katila, Technological Acquisitions and the Innovation Performance of
Acquiring Firms: A Longitudinal Study, 22 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 197, 215 (2001); Cassiman et al., supra
note 76, at 213; Panos Desyllas & Alan Hughes, Do High Technology Acquirers Become More Innovative?,
39 RES. POL’Y 1105, 1117 (2010); Joshua Sears & Glenn Hoetker, Technological Overlap, Technological
Capabilities, and Resource Recombination in Technological Acquisitions, 35 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 48, 49–
51 (2014).
93

Seungho Choi & Gerry McNamara, Repeating a Familiar Pattern in a New Way: The Effect of
Exploitation and Exploration on Knowledge Leverage Behaviors in Technology Acquisitions, 39 STRATEGIC
MGMT. J. 356, 357 (2018).
94 See Chenyu Yang, Vertical Structure and Innovation: A Study of the SoC and Smartphone Industries 1 (Sept. 1, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://perma.cc/E8QT-E52Z (studying vertical
integration with chipset systems in smartphone industries).
95

See Robert Gibbons, Taking Coase Seriously, 44 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 145 (1999).
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individual firms may employ different decisional rules, and because the
choice of decisional rule is frequently opaque, supply chain instability may
result.
The classic business school “beer game”96—known in academic
literature as the “bullwhip effect”97—exemplifies this phenomenon. The
beer game explores how an entire supply chain (suppliers, manufacturers,
and customers), purchasing agents, and marketing agents may have an
incomplete view of actual demand for beer because of a lack of
information. Each level within the supply chain can impact the entire
supply chain if that level orders too much or too little beer. Thus, there is
an interdependency of decision-making across each level of the vertical
chain. Just so, intrafirm investment coordination may produce
efficiencies because the agency costs of coordination within the firm may
be reduced below the transaction costs of coordination across multiple
actors in multiple firms.98
3.

Do Mergers and Contracts Produce the Same Benefits?

Three contractual alternatives to complete integration by merger may
yield some or all of the same economic benefits as vertical mergers when
successfully implemented by unintegrated, vertically related firms.99
First, maximum resale prices may, in certain circumstances, allow
unintegrated firms to eliminate double marginalization via contract. If
such a contract is possible, the upstream firm would optimally set a
maximum resale price equal to the price a vertically integrated firm would

96 See, e.g., JAY W. FORRESTER, INDUSTRIAL DYNAMICS 357–58 (1961); Lisa Ellram, Introduction to
the Forum on the Bullwhip Effect in the Current Economic Climate, 46 J. SUPPLY CHAIN MGMT. 3 (2010).
97

See, e.g., Rachel Crosen, Karen Donohue, Elena Katok & John Sterman, Order Stability in Supply
Chains: Coordination Risk and the Role of Coordination Stock, 23 PROD. & OPERATIONS MGMT. 176 (2014);
Ellram, supra note 96, at 3; Kimberly M. Thompson & Nima D. Badizadegan, Valuing Information in
Complex Systems: An Integrated Analytical Approach to Achieve Optimal Performance in the Beer Distribution Game, 3 IEEE ACCESS 2677, 2677–78 (2015).
98

See Crosen et al., supra note 97, at 194 (“[T]he notion of ‘optimal’ behavior is contingent on
people’s assumptions about the thinking and behavior of the other agents with whom they interact.
If a person believes that their counterparts will behave in an unpredictable and capricious fashion,
this may lead to further instability in the supply chain.”). One may assume from these findings that it
is easier through incentive alignment within a single firm, such as through financial rewards, than
alignment across firms.
99

See Roger D. Blair & Amanda K. Esquibel, Maximum Resale Price Restraints in Franchising, 65
ANTITRUST L.J. 157, 176–77 (1996); see also Roger D. Blair & David L. Kaserman, Optimal Franchising, 49
S. ECON. J. 494 (1982); Roger D. Blair & David L. Kaserman, Uncertainty and the Incentive for Vertical
Integration, 45 S. ECON. J. 266 (1978).
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charge. At the same time, the upstream firm would compensate the
downstream firm via lump-sum payment so that the downstream firm is
no worse off than it would be absent the contract. Referring back to Figure
1,100 a maximum resale price of P2 would achieve the benefits of EDM. The
downstream retailer would then sell Q2 at P2. The upstream firm would
earn a variable profit of (w1 – MCP)Q2, while the downstream firm would
earn a variable profit of zero; the upstream firm’s profit can then be shared
with the downstream firm via a lump-sum payment. The combined profit
would equal the maximum profit that a vertically integrated firm could
earn.101
A second, closely related contractual alternative is a sales quota. The
upstream firm can sell its output to the downstream firm at a price of w1
on the condition that the downstream firm purchases at least Q2 units.
Again, such a contract may require a lump-sum payment from the
upstream firm to induce the downstream firm to agree to the contract.
Referring again to Figure 1, the only way the downstream firm can sell Q2
units is to set a price of P2. Under an optimal sales quota contract, the
upstream firm’s variable profits would be (w1 – MCP)Q2, while the
downstream firm would earn zero variable profit.
A third and final contractual alternative is a two-part tariff. The
upstream and downstream firms could agree to a contract in which the
downstream firm pays a lump-sum license fee no greater than
(P2 – MCR – MCP)Q2 in exchange for the right to purchase as many units as
it would like from the upstream firm at a price equal to the upstream
firm’s marginal cost, MCP.
Maximum resale prices, sales quotas, and two-part tariffs partially
replicate EDM’s effects to the benefit of consumers. Hence, when any such
contract is observed between two unintegrated firms, it is very likely to be
efficient. Importantly, the inverse—that a lack of such contracting implies
the inefficiency of vertical integration—is false. In practice, the obstacles
that confront two unintegrated firms seeking to reach agreement on such
a contract may often be significant.102 To take just one example, optimal
implementation of a maximum resale price arrangement would require
100

Supra Section I.A.1.

101

The integrated firm’s profit is (P2 – MCR – MCP)Q2 while the unintegrated firms’ profits sum
to (w1 – MCP)Q2. Since P2 = w1 + MCR, these profits are identical. Of course, prior to State Oil Co. v.
Kahn, 522 U.S. 3 (1997), maximum resale prices were per se illegal under Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390
U.S. 145 (1968).
102 See Gregory J. Werden & Luke M. Froeb, Comment Letter on Proposed Vertical Merger Guidelines 1 (Feb. 6, 2020), https://perma.cc/PW2P-5VNA (“[I]t is essential to appreciate that vertical mergers solve coordination problems that are solved less well, or not at all, by contracts.”).
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full knowledge of both the demand curve for the final good and both
firms’ cost curves to set the maximum price. Any antitrust practitioner
knows how difficult it is to project costs and demand across a range of
counterfactual scenarios, as would be required for complete contracting.
Thus, it is likely that for many unintegrated firms, efficient contracting is
either impossible or prohibitively costly.
Instead, some commentators seem to embrace the idea that a lack of
contracting indicates that there is no conceivable gain to greater
integration. For instance, Professors Baker, Rose, Salop, and Scott Morton
state that “[i]f in advance of the merger the parties never considered
contracting to eliminate double marginalization, that fact may suggest
that EDM would not achieve substantial benefits.”103 This suggestion
overlooks innocuous explanations for lack of premerger contracting,
including insurmountable information asymmetries or contracting costs.
In contrast, EDM is not difficult for a fully vertically integrated firm to
realize: all that is required is for the upstream firm to sell its output to the
downstream firm at cost.
Putting aside the minor question of how firms could possibly
demonstrate the impossibility of achieving a certain type of contract,
there appears to be no basis for an inference that because certain types of
contracts are theoretically possible, EDM generated by merger is
irrelevant.104
In summary, while there is convincing theoretical and empirical
evidence that vertical contracts can efficiently eliminate double
marginalization, the inverse argument—that the absence of those
contracts implies they are inefficient—is wrong. An alternative—and
more likely—explanation for the inability to achieve EDM via contract is
that implementing those contracts is difficult (e.g., because of
informational asymmetries and contracting costs). Fortunately, the
Vertical Merger Guidelines broadly endorse the merger specificity of EDM
in saying that existing, premerger contracts are generally the appropriate
baseline against which EDM must be measured.105

103

Baker et al., supra note 4, at 15.

104

To do so would apply an even more stringent standard for merger specificity than the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, which state “[o]nly alternatives that are practical in the business situation
faced by the merging firms are considered in making this determination [of merger specificity]. The
Agencies do not insist upon a less restrictive alternative that is merely theoretical.” HORIZONTAL
MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 31, at 30.
105

See DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 3, at 11–12.
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B. Anticompetitive Effects of Vertical Integration
The previous Section discussed how vertical mergers spur the merged
firm to internalize a pricing externality, resulting in EDM. This Section
discusses a related pricing externality: a higher price charged by the
upstream firm to unintegrated downstream firms increases the profit of
the integrated downstream firm. Once again, the upstream firm ignores
this externality before merging, and it optimally accounts for it after
merging. This incentive change creates the potential for anticompetitive
effects to arise from vertical mergers. Potential anticompetitive effects
include complete foreclosure, theories of two-level entry, and access to
competitively sensitive information.
1.

Raising Rivals’ Costs

If an upstream firm sells to multiple downstream firms, then its
pricing to any particular downstream firm affects the profits of each other
downstream firm. Consider an upstream firm U selling to downstream
firms D1 and D2. Were U to increase the price it charges to D2, then D2
would optimally increase its final good price, causing it to lose
customers.106 If at least some of these lost customers switch to D1, then D1
will be more profitable than it was prior to U increasing the price it
charged to D2.107
When U and D1 are separately owned, U ignores the effect of its prices
on D1’s profit, while a merger of U and D1 spurs U to internalize the effect
of its price to D2 on the profits of D1. The result—higher prices to
unintegrated downstream rivals—is often referred to as raising rivals’
costs (“RRC”). Analysis of the RRC pricing externality is often associated

106

The effect of input prices on a firm’s optimal output price is well-studied in the economics
literature. See, e.g., Sonia Jaffe & E. Glen Weyl, The First-Order Approach to Merger Analysis, 5 AM. ECON.
J.: MICROECONOMICS 188 (2013) (developing a first order approximation of how upward pricing pressure generated by a horizontal merger is passed through to price); Nathan H. Miller, Marc Remer,
Conor Ryan & Gloria Sheu, Upward Pricing Pressure as a Predictor of Merger Price Effects, 52 INT’L J.
INDUS. ORG. 216 (2017) (finding that an own pass-through of one and cross pass-through of zero may
reasonably approximate pass-through of incentives generated by horizontal mergers).
107 To see this, note that D could increase its price until it had the same demand as it did prior
1
to D2’s price increase, so that it would sell the same quantity at a greater margin. Of course, a smaller
price increase may be even more profitable for D1.
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with Professor Steven Salop, who, along with coauthors, developed the
foundations for RRC theories of harm in the 1980s.108
The particular mechanism through which a vertical merger may
result in RRC depends on the nature of the interactions between upstream
and downstream firms. For example, business-to-business transactions
are commonly conducted via bargaining in which both sides attempt to
reach a mutually agreeable price (e.g., by exchanging offers). Naturally, the
party that has less to lose from a breakdown in negotiations may be in a
stronger bargaining position and thus able to demand more concessions
from the party that has more to lose from a breakdown. As Professor
William Rogerson explains, a vertical merger in this setting may result in
RRC because it “affects the disagreement payoff of the upstream firm
when it negotiates with a rival downstream firm. Its disagreement payoff
is increased because it takes into account the extra profit that its own
downstream affiliate will earn” in the event of a bargaining breakdown.109
Bargaining models have been prominent in antitrust analyses of
several recent vertical mergers between upstream video content providers
and downstream multichannel video programming distributors
(“MVPDs”).110 In AT&T, the DOJ contended that owning AT&T’s DirecTV
service would increase Time Warner’s bargaining leverage in negotiations
for its content with unintegrated MVPDs, as “[t]he alternative to an
agreement in every negotiation with a rival MVPD would be better for the
merged firm because without a deal, DirecTV would steal valuable video
subscribers away from that rival.”111 In the DOJ’s view, this additional
bargaining power would enable Time Warner to extract higher
programming fees from unintegrated MVPDs, ultimately resulting in
higher prices to consumers.
The Court found various flaws in the DOJ’s RRC theory of harm.
These flaws included unrebutted findings that similar past vertical
mergers did not result in price increases, disbelief that the improvement
to AT&T’s bargaining leverage would be substantial, failure to account for
AT&T’s long-term contract offers, and poor quality inputs to the DOJ’s

108

See, e.g., Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’
Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986); Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffman, Raising
Rivals’ Costs, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 267 (1983).
109 William P. Rogerson, Modelling and Predicting the Competitive Effects of Vertical Mergers: The
Bargaining Leverage Over Rivals (BLR) Effect, 53 CANADIAN J. ECON. 407, 409 (2020).
110

Id. at 410–11.

111

Post-Trial Brief of the United States at 1, United States v. AT&T Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161 (D.D.C.

2018).
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expert’s model.112 Similar bargaining models have been successfully
employed by the Agencies in horizontal health care mergers.113
RRC effects are likely to be of greatest concern when the merged firm
has unintegrated downstream customers and when these customers sell
products that are close substitutes for the merged firm’s own downstream
product and have limited comparable alternatives to purchasing inputs
from the merged firm. Absent these conditions, concerns about potential
RRC effects are appropriately diminished.
2.

Foreclosure

Early vertical merger enforcement was often premised on the concern
that the merged firm would not buy or sell from unintegrated firms and
that this practice was facially anticompetitive.114 To take but one example,
the Sixth Circuit upheld the FTC’s administrative blocking of a vertical
merger between a cement manufacturer and a ready mix concrete firm in
part because the merger would have increased the fraction of
northeastern US cement demand derived from vertically integrated
concrete companies from 39.6% to 46.3%, which the FTC and the Sixth
Circuit deemed “extremely significant” and “anti-competitive.”115 In the
court’s view, “[t]he important consideration is that the acquired company
would not be free to choose for itself who shall supply its needs solely on
the basis of price, service and quality of goods because the acquiring
company has the power to substitute its own suppliers.”116 The court—and
contemporary practitioners—referred to the putative closing of a
vertically integrated firm to unintegrated competitors as “foreclosure.”117

112 See AT&T, 310 F. Supp. 3d at 216 (endorsing defendants’ findings that three prior vertical transactions did not lead to price increases); id. at 224 (“[T]he lynchpin of Professor Shapiro’s testimony . . .
is the assumption that a post-merger Turner would gain increased leverage by wielding a blackout
threat that will be only somewhat less incredible.”); id. at 226 (“I agree with defendants, for the most
part, that the inputs and assumptions of Professor’s Shapiro’s model are not sufficiently grounded in
the evidence . . . .”); id. at 239–40 (summarizing long-term contract offers).
113

See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.–Namps, Inc. v. St.
Luke’s Health Sys., No. 1:12-CV-00560-BLW, 2013 WL 5410057, at *19 (D. Idaho Sept. 25, 2013) (“The
Acquisition will increase substantially St. Luke’s bargaining leverage with health plans.”).
114

For a full discussion, see infra Section II.B.

115

U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 426 F.2d 592, 601 (6th Cir. 1970).

116

Id.

117

Id. Some texts distinguish between input foreclosure, or declining to sell to unintegrated
downstream firms, and customer foreclosure, or declining to buy from unintegrated upstream firms.
This Section addresses both.
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The logic of foreclosure as an antitrust theory of harm in these early
vertical cases often rested on two assumptions: first, that vertical
integration precludes dealings with unintegrated firms, and second, that
the result of two vertically related firms dealing exclusively with each
other is necessarily anticompetitive. There is little support for either
assumption.
First, as a general matter, vertical integration does not incentivize a
firm to eliminate sales to or purchases from unintegrated firms. Profitmaximizing firms, regardless of whether they are vertically integrated, will
sell to unintegrated rivals if the price paid by those rivals exceeds marginal
cost and will purchase inputs from unintegrated rivals if the cost is lower
than that of alternatives, including self-supply.118 Empirically, Professors
Enghin Atalay, Ali Hortaçsu, and Chad Syverson find that within the set
of vertically integrated firms, only 1.2% of upstream establishments ship
exclusively to downstream establishments within the same firm.119 Indeed,
they find that roughly half of these establishments do not ship to
integrated downstream units at all, and “[e]ven the ninetieth percentile
establishment ships over 60 percent of its output outside the firm.”120 In a
separate paper, Hortaçsu and Syverson study a wave of vertical integration
between cement plants and ready mix concrete plants and find lower
prices and greater output following the merger wave, which they
characterize as “not consistent with foreclosure.”121
Of course, vertical mergers may incentivize the merged firm to offer
less favorable terms to unintegrated rivals.122 As a theoretical matter, it is
possible that RRC incentives could be so great as to rule out sales to or
purchases from unintegrated firms altogether and thus to result in total
foreclosure. It is also possible that certain firms may face a meaningful allor-nothing decision about whether to supply unintegrated rivals. For
example, Professors Jeffrey Church and Neil Gandal suggest that vertical
integration between hardware and software providers may meaningfully
118

See, e.g., David Reiffen & Michael Vita, Comment: Is There New Thinking on Vertical Mergers?,
63 ANTITRUST L.J. 917, 918 (1995) (“The integrated firm will sell the input to nonintegrated firms downstream if the ‘open’ market price exceeds the integrated firm’s marginal cost of producing the input;
it will buy the input from nonintegrated input suppliers if the market price is less than its marginal
cost of producing the input.”).
119

See Enghin Atalay, Ali Hortaçsu & Chad Syverson, Vertical Integration and Input Flows, 104 AM.
ECON. REV. 1120, 1127 (2014) (Table 1, column headed “Fraction = 1”).
120

Id.

121

Ali Hortaçsu & Chad Syverson, Cementing Relationships: Vertical Integration, Foreclosure,
Productivity, and Prices, 115 J. POL. ECON. 250, 262 (2007) (finding that vertical integration is empirically
associated with lower concrete prices).
122

See supra Section I.B.1.
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alter incentives to make software compatible with rivals’ hardware as the
software maker internalizes the effect of compatibility on the hardware
maker’s profits.123 If the incompatibility decision would not be easily
reversible, then a focus on whether (total) foreclosure would result from
such a merger may be appropriate. However, whether foreclosure is
contemplated as the result of a large RRC incentive or as the result of an
all-or-nothing compatibility decision, a conclusion that foreclosure is
likely should only be reached after careful factual scrutiny. In particular,
given available empirical results suggesting that vertically integrated firms
rarely forego interacting with unintegrated rivals,124 foreclosure should
not be assumed as an inevitable consequence of vertical integration. Even
a determination that foreclosure would be more profitable than the status
quo for the merging firms is insufficient to support a foreclosure theory if
the alternative of continuing to sell to unintegrated rivals at higher prices
remains most profitable. If this alternative is ignored in formulating a
foreclosure theory, competitive harms may be overstated relative to an
RRC theory, under which the merged firm would continue to sell to rivals.
Second, courts adjudicating early vertical cases seemed to treat
foreclosure as self-evidently anticompetitive. For example, in Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States,125 the Court viewed foreclosure as the “primary vice of
a vertical merger,” because “the arrangement may act as a ‘clog on
competition’” by preventing rivals from competing for the business of the
vertically integrated firm.126 But a firm would withdraw from the open
market only if it earned a higher profit from dealing exclusively with its
vertically integrated counterpart than it would from any nonintegrated
firm. True foreclosure, then, benefits both the foreclosing firm and its
customers.127 Whether customers of the remaining firms are harmed at
all—much less to an extent that would cancel out the benefits accruing to
customers of the foreclosing firm—necessarily requires fact finding and

123 See Jeffrey Church & Neil Gandal, Systems Competition, Vertical Merger, and Foreclosure, 9 J.
ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 25, 29 (2000) (“[F]oreclosure will be a credible threat if the fixed costs of
eliminating compatibility, i.e., of foreclosure, are relatively small and the costs of reestablishing compatibility are relatively large (which is typically the case).”).
124

See supra note 35.

125

370 U.S. 294 (1962).

126

Id. at 323–24 (quoting Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 314 (1949)).

127

The mechanism through which the foreclosing firm would find it optimal to withdraw from
the open market is the elimination of double marginalization, which benefits consumers as well as
vertically integrated firms. See supra Section I.A.1 for a full discussion.
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empirical analyses.128 Indeed, in The Antitrust Paradox, Judge Robert Bork
observed that a vertical merger may largely rearrange supplier-customer
relationships with no real harm done.129 While foreclosure resulting from
vertical integration may, in certain circumstances, result in consumer
harm, plaintiffs must bear the burden of explaining why a given merger
falls into those circumstances; courts should not view consumer harm as
an inexorable consequence of foreclosure.
While the Agencies have not fully litigated a merger under a
foreclosure theory since 1977,130 concerns about foreclosure appear to have
formed the basis for several consents131 and one recent private lawsuit.132
Foreclosure appears prominently in the Vertical Merger Guidelines,133
albeit alongside RRC. Although the economic literature has increasingly
viewed foreclosure as a special case of RRC,134 there are exceptions. To take
one example, the influential paper of Professors Janusz Ordover, Garth
Saloner, and Steven Salop models equilibrium foreclosure resulting from
a vertical merger. They abstract from EDM by modelling perfect
competition upstream to find that vertical foreclosure is often a profitable
strategy for merging firms, resulting in higher prices and lower consumer
welfare.135 Importantly, the Ordover, Saloner, and Salop paper and other
related papers assume that vertically integrated firms have the ability to
commit to not selling to unintegrated firms, even if they could profitably
do so because the price those firms would be willing to pay exceeds the
integrated firm’s marginal cost of production. Absent the ability to

128

See Michael A. Salinger, Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure, 103 Q.J. ECON. 345, 355 (1988)
(describing tradeoff between unintegrated producers having lower demand—resulting in lower
prices—and higher concentration among these producers—resulting in higher prices— and concluding that “[a] vertical merger does not, therefore, necessarily result in market foreclosure of unintegrated producers”).
129

See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 232 (1978).

130

See United States v. Hammermill Paper Co., 429 F. Supp. 1271 (W.D. Pa. 1977).

131

See generally Steven C. Salop & Daniel P. Culley, Vertical Merger Enforcement Actions: 1994–
April 2020 (Apr. 15, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://perma.cc/UUW8-HZED (summarizing
sixty-six enforcement actions relating to vertical concerns).
132 See Steves & Sons, Inc. v. Jeld-Wen, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 3d 614, 682 (E.D. Va. 2018) (ordering
equitable remedies to cure an instance of input foreclosure), appeal dismissed, Case No. 19-2466, 2020
WL 3422366 (4th Cir. June 8, 2020).
133

See DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 3, at 4.

134

See, e.g., Baker et al., supra note 4, at 13 (“‘Foreclosure’ is broadly defined. For example, input
foreclosure includes price increases, cost increases, and other disadvantages placed on downstream
rivals, not just total denial of the relevant input.”).
135 See, e.g., Janusz A. Ordover, Garth Saloner & Steven C. Salop, Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure,
80 AM. ECON. REV. 127, 136 (1990).
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commit to forego profitable sales, vertical integration need not result in
foreclosure at all. As economist David Reiffen puts it, since the Ordover,
Saloner, and Salop result hinges on commitment—and not vertical
integration per se—“it is difficult to see how the [Ordover, Saloner, and
Salop] results are related to vertical integration at all.”136
While there are papers with foreclosure models that avoid Dr.
Reiffen’s criticism,137 no generally accepted approach to modelling
foreclosure is available that can reliably “distinguish harmful from
beneficial vertical mergers,” as Professor Michael Salinger suggested
would be required for a rule of reason in a 1988 paper on foreclosure.138
3.

Two-Level Entry

Two-level entry refers to a theory that the presence of a vertically
integrated firm in markets A and B may make entry into either market A
or market B more difficult (e.g., the vertically integrated firm will decline
to sell to or buy from a new entrant). Historically, two-level entry was a
common theory of harm in vertical merger cases, and it received
substantial discussion in the 1984 Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines.139
Two-level entry may also be used to consider vertical contracts—such as
exclusive dealing—as a barrier to entry for the upstream market.140 In the
example of Brown Shoe, Brown’s exclusive dealing contracts with shoe
stores could create a second barrier to entry for rival shoe manufacturers
because entry would need to occur at two levels rather than a single
level.141 This theory has faded from prominence, which Professors Phillip
Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp ascribe to a recognition that two-level
entry barriers are rarely significant.142 The Vertical Merger Guidelines
contain one example considering two-level entry, which states that the
Agencies would weigh foreclosure of potential entrants against the
benefits of EDM.143

136

David Reiffen, Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure: Comment, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 694, 694 (1992).

137

See, e.g., Church & Gandal, supra note 123.

138

Salinger, supra note 128, at 355.

139

See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 23–24.

140

PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 1802e (4th ed. 2018).
141

See Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 302–03 (1962).
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See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 140, ¶ 1802e.

143

See DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 3, at 4.
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Misuse of Competitively Sensitive Information and Coordinated
Effects

In some circumstances, vertical integration may give one firm access
to sensitive information of the other firm’s trading partners. If there is
competitive overlap between one half of a vertically integrated pair of
firms and the other half’s trading partners, a merger may allow one firm
to access and act upon sensitive information about its competitors in a
way that harms competition. In the 2018 merger of Staples and Essendant,
this concern about harming competition prompted the FTC to require
Staples to firewall competitively sensitive information about Essendant’s
retailer customers.144
The Agencies sometimes view the greater transparency created by
accessing a vertical partner’s competitive intelligence as a potential
facilitator to coordination across horizontal competitors. For example, in
the 2017 merger of Danone (yogurt) and WhiteWave (milk), the DOJ
feared that Danone’s prior commercial partnership with a competing milk
manufacturer, CROPP, would facilitate post-merger collusion between
WhiteWave and CROPP.145 The DOJ ordered Danone to divest its
Stonyfield brand, which severed the relationship between Danone and
CROPP.146
C. Balancing Procompetitive and Anticompetitive Effects of Vertical
Integration
A vertical merger typically produces both procompetitive (e.g., EDM)
and anticompetitive (e.g., RRC) unilateral effects in addition to
efficiencies. In contrast, a problematic horizontal merger is likely to
produce only harmful unilateral effects (e.g., upward pricing pressure) in
addition to efficiencies.
In horizontal enforcement, the Agencies commonly assess the extent
to which one merging firm constrains the other. If the Agencies determine
that the merging firms’ competitive overlap is significant, they may
independently analyze any efficiency claims the parties present. Both as a

144

See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Imposes Conditions on Staples’ Acquisition of
Office Supply Wholesaler Essendant Inc. (Jan. 28, 2019), https://perma.cc/V2VH-D49R.
145 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., Justice Department Requires Divestiture of Danone’s Stonyfield Farms Business in Order for Danone to Proceed with WhiteWave Acquisition (Apr. 3, 2017), https://perma.cc/BD5N-BE3H.
146

See id.
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matter of practice and as a matter of law,147 these assessments are separate:
plaintiffs are responsible for harms and defendants are responsible for
efficiencies. Literature148 and our combined experience149 suggest that
efficiencies evidence rarely suffices to overcome an agency determination
that the merging firms would, in combination, create likely
anticompetitive effects. Thus, to a large extent, the Agencies attempt to
block a merger upon a finding that it will likely produce harm.
Whatever the merits of the Agencies’ approach to horizontal mergers,
an analogous approach to vertical enforcement is indefensible. The same
forces that could give rise to harm in vertical mergers also produce
consumer benefits. Both EDM and RRC result from the merged firm’s
internalization of pricing externalities.150 Moreover, the forces that are
posited to give rise to harmful RRC effects are closely related to those that
produce beneficial EDM effects, meaning that a determination that
significant RRC is likely should lead one to suspect that significant EDM
is likely as well. Consequently, EDM and RRC must be analyzed
concurrently, and a determination that a vertical merger is likely to result
in RRC or foreclosure is unavailing without a concurrent analysis of EDM
effects.
For ease of exposition, this Section is confined to the discussion of
RRC and not total foreclosure (which, in many cases, is essentially an
extreme case of RRC). However, the Section applies with equal force to
foreclosure theories of harm, which should not be analyzed independently
of EDM for the same reasons.
1.

EDM Is a Determinant of RRC

As a theoretical matter, it is not possible to determine the magnitude
of a firm’s RRC incentive without knowledge of its EDM incentive. As
economists Gopal Das Varma and Martino De Stefano explain in a recent

147

See infra Section II.C (discussing the Baker Hughes burden-shifting framework).

148

See Malcolm B. Coate & Andrew J. Heimert, Merger Efficiencies at the Federal Trade Commission 1997-2007, at 3, 16–18 (2009) (unpublished manuscript), https://perma.cc/WRT2-FAWY
(summarizing data collected from internal FTC memos written between 1997 and 2007 demonstrating that Bureau of Competition staff accepted 29 of 342 efficiency claims, and accepted at least one
efficiency claim in “4.2 percent of settled matters, 6.9 percent of the PI matters, and 15.3 percent of
the closed cases”); Daniel A. Crane, Rethinking Merger Efficiencies, 110 MICH. L. REV. 347, 358 & n.49
(2011) (summarizing evidence that “practitioners report that the agencies usually react with coolness
to efficiencies arguments”).
149

See Wilson, supra note 49.

150

See supra Section I.A.1.
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paper, EDM generically results in lower prices for the final good sold by
the integrated firm.151 This lower price will cause at least some
substitution away from competing products—including those made by
rival downstream firms—reducing these firms’ demand for inputs. Since
the optimal input price charged by any upstream firm (with or without
RRC) depends on the demand for that firm’s product, EDM, by itself,
would generically lower the price charged to unintegrated downstream
firms. Consequently, EDM both affects the RRC incentive (by lowering
the unintegrated downstream firms’ demand for the input) and lowers the
amount of the total price increase relative to a counterfactual world in
which, arguendo, the vertically integrated firm is prevented from
obtaining EDM.
Given the link between the sizes of EDM and RRC effects, it is
unsurprising that few, if any, structural screens reliably predict the net
effects of mergers.152 For example, economists Gloria Sheu and Charles
Taragin use simulated data to show that varying the number of upstream
and downstream firms, and thus concentration, does not meaningfully
affect the distribution of outcomes of vertical mergers.153 Instead, the data
contain both harmful and beneficial vertical mergers in both concentrated
and unconcentrated upstream and downstream markets, suggesting that
concentration levels are not correlated with the effect of vertical mergers
on consumer welfare. Sheu and Taragin find that “EDM between the
merging firms is a primary determinant of whether there is consumer
harm overall.”154
Finally, in a recent comment to the FTC, Salinger describes a
numerical example in which a single upstream firm sells to two
downstream firms producing differentiated products.155 In the example,
vertical integration between the upstream firm and one downstream firm
not only lowers the final good price for the integrated downstream firm
(because of EDM) but also lowers the final good price of the unintegrated
downstream firm. This latter effect is the combination of an RRC effect
(the integrated firm raises its price to the unintegrated firm to shift
151

See Das Varma & De Stefano, supra note 32, at 3 n.5.

152

But see Baker et al., supra note 4, at 16 (“If both markets are unconcentrated, it is less likely
that a vertical merger would be anticompetitive.”).
153

See Gloria Sheu & Charles Taragin, Simulating Mergers in a Vertical Supply Chain with Bargaining 24 (Apr. 15, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://perma.cc/4M7V-LKD5.
154 Id. at 25 (describing also how variation in randomly drawn margins “drives nearly all the variation in harm”).
155 See Michael A. Salinger, Comment Letter on the Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines, at 3 (Feb.
24, 2020), https://perma.cc/TK3R-7YPW.
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demand to its downstream unit) and the unintegrated firm’s lower
demand (caused by the integrated firm’s EDM and lower price). In the
example, consumers are unambiguously better off because prices are
lower and quantities are higher. While the example makes no claim to
generality, it illustrates why RRC must be analyzed concurrently with
EDM as described in the Vertical Merger Guidelines.156
2.

Anticompetitive Vertical Mergers Are Difficult to Distinguish
from Procompetitive Mergers

When analyzing horizontal mergers, the Agencies and courts employ
a number of heuristics that are likely to be somewhat predictive about true
outcomes. Qualitatively, documentary evidence—including closeness of
competition, customer concerns, and win-loss records—speaks to the
central question of the strength of the competitive constraint that will be
lost with a horizontal merger. Quantitatively, even simple metrics—
including upward pricing pressure,157 change in Herfindahl index,158 and
firm count159—have at least some predictive power. Even relatively coarse
or imprecise measures may suffice for horizontal merger enforcement
when the enforcement is predicated on a claim that the loss in
competition is large and efficiencies are small.
Tools used in horizontal merger analysis do not apply with equal force
to vertical mergers. Without more, qualitative evidence showing RRC or
foreclosure effects—such as concerns from rivals or documents indicating
RRC is likely—is not outcome determinative on the question of whether
the merger harms consumers because EDM and RRC must be analyzed
concurrently.160 Various flavors of pricing pressure indices for vertical

156 See DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 3, at 5 (stating that the Agencies generally assess the “net effect” of “all changes to the merged firm’s unilateral incentives,” including both
RRC and EDM).
157

See Miller et al., supra note 106, at 238 tbl.8 (showing that a matrix of upward pricing pressure
terms premultiplied by an identity passthrough matrix is a reasonable approximation of true merger
price effects, across a dataset of simulated industries).
158 See Volker Nocke & Michael D. Whinston, Concentration Screens for Horizontal Mergers 17,
tbl.4 (Apr. 29, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://perma.cc/3REE-74B3 (showing that as “delta
HHI” increases much greater efficiencies are needed, on average, to offset merger price effects).
159

See Charles Taragin & Margaret Loudermilk, Using Measures of Competitive Harm for Optimal Screening of Horizontal Mergers 16 (Oct. 2, 2019) (unpublished manuscript),
https://perma.cc/9YAQ-BUQQ (“Taken together these observations suggest that a significant amount
of information about potential price effects is conveyed by the Firm Count measure.”).
160

See supra Section I.C.1.
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mergers attempt to account for EDM.161 However, these indices perform
poorly in simulations and are based on separate measurements of EDM
and RRC that do not account for the effect of EDM on the size of RRC.162
As discussed previously, firm count and concentration measures do not
appear to be useful predictors of the net unilateral effect. Notably, the
Vertical Merger Guidelines state merely that the Agencies “may consider
measures of market shares and market concentration” but do not state
that share is likely to be outcome determinative.163 The Vertical Merger
Guidelines dropped a provision in earlier draft Guidelines that the
Agencies would be unlikely to challenge a merger if both firms had market
shares below twenty percent.164
3.

Evaluating EDM and RRC

If plaintiffs are to assume the task of concurrently measuring EDM
and RRC effects—as DOJ did to some extent in AT&T—there will naturally
be methodological questions about the best way to implement this
analysis. Unfortunately, there are few clear answers to these questions at
this time.
Merger simulation is one tool capable of concurrently and
prospectively analyzing EDM and RRC, including the effect of the former
on the size of the latter. DOJ used merger simulation in AT&T, although
DOJ’s expert witness appears to have calculated EDM and RRC separately
and then used them as inputs into a model of horizontal competition.165

161

See Serge Moresi & Steven C. Salop, vGUPPI: Scoring Unilateral Pricing Incentives in Vertical
Mergers, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 185, 186 (2013).
162 See Gleb B. Domnenko & David S. Sibley, Simulating Vertical Mergers and the Vertical GUPPI
Approach 16 (Jan. 1, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://perma.cc/HZ9T-2QCN (“Regarding the
accuracy of the vertical GUPPI approach, our results are mostly negative.”); see also Gopal Das Varma
& Martino DeStefano, Comment Letter on the Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines, at 8 (Feb. 26, 2020),
https://perma.cc/XGW2-ALWU (“When we compare the predicted RRC effect using a price pressure
analysis (that ignores change in output shares due to EDM) with that from an equilibrium simulation
(that takes account of change in shares due to EDM), we find that the price pressure technique can
significantly mis-predict the size of RRC.”).
163

See DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 3, at 3.

164

U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, DRAFT VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES 8

(2020), https://perma.cc/T9DJ-NRBB.
165

See Das Varma & De Stefano, supra note 32, at 11 n.13 (“Professor Shapiro’s expert report indicates that he first used the standard approach to separately estimate the magnitudes of wholesale
price increase and EDM. Those estimates then served as inputs in an equilibrium model of horizontal
competition between cable companies that generated estimates of the effect of the merger on retail
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Even with this simplification, the DOJ’s expert was unable to populate the
model with credible inputs.166 Nonetheless, it is very likely that the next
litigated vertical merger challenge will rely in part on a merger simulation
model. While these models are at least capable of capturing the
interaction between EDM and RRC, this capability comes at the expense
of relatively strong assumptions about the curvature of demand and cost
curves and, depending on the model, relatively high input requirements.
These assumptions are not innocuous,167 and courts may struggle to
understand the economic modelling required to concurrently weigh EDM
and RRC.168
An alternative approach, seemingly favored by proponents of a more
interventionist policy towards vertical mergers, tasks plaintiffs only with
measuring harmful effects of mergers and leaves it to defendants to
measure procompetitive effects, including EDM.169 This approach could,
for example, block mergers that exceed certain thresholds for market
share in the upstream and downstream markets. As market shares are
relatively easy to measure, this approach would have the advantage of
being implementable. However, the approach would have the significant
disadvantage of basing merger enforcement on metrics that are not
correlated with the effect of a merger on consumer welfare.
Vertical enforcement may be most feasible in the specialized
circumstances where EDM is unlikely to result at all—for example, where
the upstream and downstream firms make incompatible products.170
Outside these special circumstances, the difficulty in distinguishing
presumably rare anticompetitive vertical mergers from more common

cable prices. Needless to say, this augmented standard approach does not incorporate the equilibrium
effect of EDM on RRC.”).
166

See id.

167

See Miller et al., supra note 106, at 228 (finding that the error from upward-pricing-pressure
predictions are often less than that from mis-specified merger simulations, which assume too much
or too little demand curvature, relative to the true state of the world).
168

The number of times in which courts cite RRC is surprisingly small. We collected data from
the Caselaw Access Project (“CAP”) of Harvard Law School. The CAP has a dataset that includes nearly
1.7 million federal cases. The CAP’s Historical Trends tool searches for specific words and phrases
from this dataset and graphs their frequency throughout time. Using this tool, we identified those
federal cases that cite “raising rival’s cost.” In any given year, the number of cases that uses the term
raising rival’s cost appears either 0 or 1 time except for three years where the term appeared in two
cases. This limited judicial experience with vertical mergers suggests courts may be hesitant to grapple
with complex economic models, at least in this context.
169 See, e.g., Baker et al., supra note 4, at 16–17 (summarizing various presumptions); Open Markets Institute, supra note 21, at 21–23.
170

See supra Section I.A.1.
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procompetitive vertical mergers should suggest caution to the Agencies. If
the information gathered during an investigation or in litigation is
insufficient to reliably predict which vertical mergers are likely to harm
consumers, then it is all the more important to keep in mind the empirical
work finding that most vertical mergers are likely to improve consumer
welfare.171
4.

Evaluating Efficiencies

Vertical mergers may be particularly likely to result in efficiencies that
benefit consumers.172 Thus, once the Agencies have assessed the net effect
of EDM and RRC, their attention must turn to whether the magnitude of
the net effect, if positive, likely exceeds the magnitude of efficiencies.
As a general matter, there are practical impediments to quantifying
efficiencies that may result from vertical mergers. Firms may not collect
the necessary data for ex post measurement of efficiencies. Even if
companies can quantify past merger efficiencies to show the ability to
integrate post-merger, each quantification is fact-specific and includes
other variables that may be hard to measure—for example, organizational
structure, management and personnel issues, and cultural factors.
Even if the Agencies had the tools to measure these efficiencies
accurately, they may lack the theoretical framework to properly evaluate
and weigh them. While the Agencies use simple tools like compensating
marginal cost reduction to evaluate the magnitude of efficiencies that
would be required to offset upward pricing pressure resulting from a
horizontal merger,173 no comparable metric exists for vertical mergers.
Since cognizable efficiencies, like EDM, incentivize the integrated firm to
lower the price of its final good, the efficiencies may also affect the
magnitude of any RRC effect.174
The Vertical Merger Guidelines discuss EDM at length but state that
efficiencies resulting from vertical mergers are analyzed under section 10
of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, suggesting that holistic vertical
merger efficiencies may not be given full consideration.175 Given that firms
may not collect detailed accounting and survey data on the long-term

171

See Cooper et al., supra note 29, at 658; Global Antitrust Institute, supra note 29, at 6–9.

172

See supra Section I.A.2.

173

See Gregory J. Werden, A Robust Test for Consumer Welfare Enhancing Mergers Among Sellers of
Differentiated Products, 44 J. INDUS. ECON. 409, 412–13 (1996).
174

See supra Section I.C.1.

175

See Wilson, supra note 49.
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performance of prior acquisitions, the Agencies should incentivize better
data collection by firms on past instances of vertical integration, by
signaling that the Agencies will seriously consider such evidence in
evaluating future mergers. The nature of vertical efficiencies suggests they
may be, as a general matter, greater than those resulting from horizontal
mergers.
Given the broader problem, more studies should be conducted about
optimization within firms—both via contract and via merger.176 Such
studies could usefully identify additional types of efficiencies that
vertically integrated firms may achieve. For example, it may be that
increased digitization, artificial intelligence, and machine learning create
new efficiencies not yet contemplated by many practitioners.
D. Summary
Part I outlines empirical results suggesting that many, if not most,
vertical mergers benefit consumers, that harmful RRC effects depend on
beneficial EDM effects, that these effects must be analyzed concurrently,
and that it is likely that even most mergers that result in RRC increase
consumer welfare. Against this backdrop, vertical merger enforcement
should proceed cautiously, perhaps with a particular focus on special cases
where EDM is likely to be zero or small. More generally, few reliable tools
exist to distinguish rare anticompetitive mergers from common
procompetitive vertical mergers.
II. Legal Background
Although the literature on potential anticompetitive effects reaches
back decades—particularly in the case of foreclosure theories177—vertical
merger challenges that result in decided cases always have been rare.
Indeed, there were no decided vertical merger challenges at all for the first
thirty-five years of the Clayton Act because the Agencies believed—

176 See FRANCINE LAFONTAINE & MARGARET SLADE, EXCLUSIVE CONTRACTS AND VERTICAL
RESTRAINTS: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 20, app. 1–3 tbl.1–3 (2005) (providing a table
summarizing “studies that assess the consequences of all types of vertical restraints and legal restrictions on vertical contracts” as “highlight[ing] how very few studies there really are in each category
and in total” and concluding that “[c]learly, much more work is needed in this area”).
177 See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 328–34 (1962) (raising both input
and customer foreclosure, which were already well-developed theories by 1962).
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reasonably—that the original statute did not reach vertical mergers at
all.178
After an abortive attempt to use the Sherman Act instead,179 Congress
revised the Clayton Act in 1950 to “make it clear” that the Agencies had
the authority to challenge anticompetitive vertical mergers under section
7.180 Over the next thirty years, the Agencies brought a number of
significant vertical merger enforcement actions, almost always winning.
Over time, the courts developed a six-factor test—purportedly drawn
from the then-current economic learning and the legislative history of
section 7—that treated vertical mergers as highly suspect.181 The Agencies
likewise cast a jaundiced eye; in the DOJ’s 1968 Merger Guidelines, the
DOJ asserted that almost any “large vertical merger” likely violated section
7 because the likely procompetitive efficiencies would rarely, if ever, offset
the likely anticompetitive harms.182
During this period, the DOJ and FTC challenged twenty-seven
vertical mergers.183 The Supreme Court said that “[t]aken as a whole, the
legislative history illuminates congressional concern with the protection
of competition, not competitors, and its desire to restrain mergers only to
the extent that such combinations may tend to lessen competition.”184 Yet
in an era when multiple goals of antitrust played a prominent role, the
courts often interpreted section 7 to protect less efficient competitors.
Around the same time, however, new economic evidence began to
emerge demonstrating the procompetitive benefits of vertical

178

See infra Section II.A

179

See United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 522, 524–27 (1948).

180

See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 590 (1957).

181

See Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 328–29, 332; E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 353 U.S. at 591–95; Miss.
River Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 454 F.2d 1083, 1091 (8th Cir. 1972); U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fed. Trade
Comm’n, 426 F.2d 593, 599 (1970).
182

See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES 9–10 (1968), https://perma.cc/VVP6-WEBE
(“While it is true that in some instances vertical integration may raise barriers to entry or disadvantage
existing competitors only as the result of the achievement of significant economies of production or
distribution (as, for example, where the increase in barriers is due to achievement of economies of
integrated production through an alteration of the structure of the plant as well as of the firm), integration accomplished by a large vertical merger will usually raise entry barriers or disadvantage competitors to an extent not accounted for by, and wholly disproportionate to, such economies as may
result from the merger.”).
183 See Alan A. Fisher & Richard S. Sciacca, An Economic Analysis of Vertical Merger Enforcement
Policy, 6 RES. L. & ECON. 1, 59 tbl.8 (1984).
184

Brown Shoe , 370 U.S. at 320 (emphasis in original).
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integration.185 This economic learning did not immediately make its way
to the Agencies or the courts.
At first, these efficiencies were treated as further evidence of
anticompetitive harm. For example, in 1964 the DOJ convinced a district
court that vertical mergers, although “[t]hey often lead to economic and
efficient operation” and are therefore “desirable from an economic
standpoint,” were nonetheless “undesirable from a social standpoint” and
proscribed by section 7.186 In its 1968 Merger Guidelines, the DOJ
announced its intention to challenge a proposed vertical merger between
a supplier with at least ten percent of sales and a purchaser with at least
six percent.187 Likewise, in the early 1970s, the FTC convinced two circuit
courts that the presence of large vertical merger efficiencies harmed less
efficient local rivals, making the underlying merger unlawful under
section 7.188
Yet soon thereafter, the Supreme Court reminded the lower courts
that the antitrust laws were designed “for the protection of competition,
not competitors,”189 and meant it. A new set of cases suggested that there
were plausible procompetitive reasons for many vertical contractual
restraints.190 The lower courts duly changed course. In 1979, the Second
Circuit rejected an FTC vertical merger challenge, concluding that section
7 requires the plaintiff in a vertical merger challenge to show actual harm
to competition, not simply foreclosure.191 It also recognized that, by
combining complementary stages of production, vertical mergers “may

185

See, e.g., Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19,
33–34 (1957); Ward S. Bowman, Jr., The Prerequisites and Effects of Resale Price Maintenance, 22 U. CHI.
L. REV. 825, 855–58 (1955); Aaron Director & Edward H. Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51
NW. U. L. REV. 281, 290 (1956); Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. &
ECON. 86, 104–05 (1960).
186

United States v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 231 F. Supp. 95, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).

187

See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 182, at 10.

188

See Miss. River Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 454 F.2d 1083, 1091–92 (8th Cir. 1972); U.S. Steel
Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 426 F.2d 593, 593, 601–03, 609–10 (1970).
189 Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977) (quoting Brown Shoe,
370 U.S. at 320).
190 See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58 (1977) (“Certainly, there has
been no showing in this case, either generally or with respect to Sylvania’s agreements, that vertical
restrictions have or are likely to have a pernicious effect on competition or that they lack [] any redeeming virtue. Accordingly, we conclude that the per se rule stated in Schwinn must be overruled.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 15 (1997); Business Elecs.
Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723–26 (1988).
191

See Fruehauf Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 603 F.2d 345, 355 (2d Cir. 1979).

802

George Mason Law Review

[Vol. 27:3

even operate to increase competition.”192 In 1984, the DOJ issued NonHorizontal Merger Guidelines recognizing—in stark contrast to its 1968
statement—that vertical mergers “are less likely than horizontal mergers
to create competitive problems[.]”193
Since the Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, the Agencies have
averaged a handful—typically two or three—of significant vertical merger
matters each year.194 The vast majority—all but AT&T’s acquisition of Time
Warner—were abandoned, cleared without conditions, or cleared subject
to a consent agreement. Although the pace of significant merger
challenges has increased somewhat in the past couple of years, vertical
merger challenges remain far rarer than those involving horizontal
transactions.
This Part synthesizes the extant vertical merger law. In doing so, it
illustrates the courts’ shift in thinking about vertical mergers. From an
institutional standpoint, it also details how courts have applied economic
concepts in vertical merger cases.
A. The Early Application of Section 7 to Vertical Mergers (Pre-1980)
As an “anti-trust” law, section 7 of the Clayton Act was originally
aimed at prohibiting stock transactions that allowed horizontal
competitors to form into large trusts—most notably, the Standard Oil
trust.195 Although vertical mergers were fairly common, the Agencies did
not challenge any vertical mergers for many years because the original Act
did not, as the Supreme Court later said, “appear to preclude the
acquisition of stock in any corporation other than a direct competitor.”196
Specifically, section 7 originally prohibited stock acquisitions “where the
effect of such acquisition may be to substantially lessen competition
between the corporation whose stock is so acquired and the corporation
making the acquisition, or to restrain such commerce in any section or
community, or tend to create a monopoly of any line of commerce.”197
192

Id. at 352.

193

DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 23.

194

See Salop & Culley, supra note 131, at 1; see also Chamber of Commerce of the United States of
America, Comment Letter on the Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines, at 2 (Feb. 14, 2020),
https://perma.cc/P8ML-MPMS.
195 See, e.g., Barak Orbach & D. Daniel Sokol, Antitrust Energy, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 429, 431, 445
(2012) (describing issues surrounding Standard Oil).
196
197

Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 313 (1962).

Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1914) (emphasis added); see also United States v. E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 589 (1957) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 18).
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From the statute’s passage, the FTC interpreted section 7—
particularly the clause quoted above—to apply only to stock acquisitions
involving horizontal competitors. For example, in its 1929 report to
Congress, the Commission noted many vertical mergers—which it then
called “integrated industries”—that it could not review:
During the year the commission’s attention has been directed to a number of
consolidations and combinations involving noncompeting products. Two or three of the
largest involved concerns engaged in a nation-wide business in food products. Some of
these inquiries are still pending. However, most of these consolidations and acquisitions
were of corporations engaged in the distribution of allied but noncompetitive products.
Preliminary inquiry disclosed that the commission could take no corrective action under
the Clayton Act even though the consolidation was effected through the acquisition or
exchange of capital stock. The trend toward consolidation of integrated industries was
198
very pronounced at the close of the year.

Although the Commission believed it lacked legal authority to
challenge vertical transactions, these deals were—and remain—
commonplace. Altogether, the Commission determined that twenty-five
percent (49 of 196 “inquiries”) of the merger investigations it completed in
1929 “were filed [closed] without action because of lack of competition,
either because of the territory served or that the products involved were not
competitive.”199 In addition to “food products,”200 the Commission
identified “[o]ther acquisitions or mergers of integrated lines involv[ing]
aviation, radio, talking machines, rubber goods, motion pictures, oil,
drugs, and chemicals.”201
Given its perceived lack of legal authority, the Commission, for many
years, urged Congress to revise the statute to encompass vertical
transactions,202 and Congress, for many years, did not act. Finally, as part
of a much broader package of antitrust amendments in 1950, Congress
altered section 7 so that it covered vertical transactions.203 As later
explained by the Supreme Court:
[B]y the deletion [in the 1950 amendment] of the ‘acquiring-acquired’ language in the
original text, [Congress] hoped to make plain that § 7 applied not only to mergers between

198

FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANN. REP. 60 (1929), https://perma.cc/K3EC-Q8Y6.

199

Id. (emphasis added).

200

Id.

201

Id. at 7.

202

See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 313 n.21 (1962) (“[The opinion
that § 7 did not reach vertical transactions] was the manner in which the Federal Trade Commission
had viewed the prohibitions of original § 7.”).
203

See Cellar-Kefauver Act, Pub. L. No. 81–899, § 7, 64 Stat. 1125, 1126 (1950).

804

George Mason Law Review

[Vol. 27:3

actual competitors, but also to vertical and conglomerate mergers whose effect may tend
204
to lessen competition in any line of commerce in any section of the country.

The Supreme Court also noted that “the deletion of the ‘acquiringacquired’ test was the direct result of an amendment offered by the Federal
Trade Commission” and subsequently introduced by Congressman Estes
Kefauver.205
The Supreme Court defined the contours of section 7 more precisely
in the late 1950s and early 1960s. In United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours
& Co.206—a case the DOJ brought in 1949 on the eve of the Cellar–Kefauver
Amendments—the Court ignored the “acquired-acquiring” limitation in
the original statute and ruled that section 7 reached vertical mergers even
before its amendment.207 In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, the Court
condemned a vertical merger combining a shoe manufacturer that
accounted for “about 4% of the Nation’s total footwear production” with a
shoe retailer that made “about 1.2% of all national retail shoe sales.”208
Brown Shoe also established four foundational legal rules applicable to
vertical mergers. First, the Court concluded from the legislative history
and plain terms of section 7 that Congress “recognized the stimulation to
competition that might flow from particular mergers” and therefore
“sought to create an effective tool for preventing all mergers having
demonstrable anti-competitive effects.”209 Consequently, the statute
“would not impede, for example, a merger between two small companies
to enable the combination to compete more effectively with larger
corporations dominating the relevant market.”210 The Court also
recognized that, although “[e]very extended vertical arrangement by its
very nature, for at least a time, denies to competitors of the supplier the
204 Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 317. Nevertheless, “[i]n short, the legislative history, like the statute,
leaves the courts free to formulate, and to change, rules governing vertical mergers in light of the kind
of economic analysis and administrative considerations that apply to horizontal mergers and antitrust
issues generally.” AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 140, ¶ 1002.
205

Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 317 n.30.

206

353 U.S. 586 (1957).

207

Id. at 592 (“We hold that any acquisition by one corporation of all or any part of the stock of
another corporation, competitor or not, is within the reach of the section whenever the reasonable
likelihood appears that the acquisition will result in a restraint of commerce or in the creation of a
monopoly of any line of commerce.”). The dissent is also worth noting because it focuses on the “competitive merits” of the case. See id. at 628 (Burton, J., dissenting). This also came up in two cases from
the 1970s. United States v. Hammermill Paper Co., 429 F. Supp. 1271, 1288 (W.D. Pa. 1977); Findings of
Fact, United States v. IT&T, No. 69 C 924, 1971 WL 541 at *36 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 2, 1971).
208

Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 303.

209

Id. at 319.

210

Id.
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opportunity to compete for part or all of the trade of the customer-party
to the vertical arrangement,” the “Clayton Act does not render unlawful
all such vertical arrangements,” but rather only those whose effect may be
to substantially reduce competition.211
Second, the assessment of competitive effects—presumably both
procompetitive and anticompetitive—was necessarily probabilistic. As the
Court explained, “Congress used the words ‘may be substantially to lessen
competition,’ . . . to indicate that its concern was with probabilities, not
certainties.”212 The Court also said—presumably for the same reason—that
“the tests for measuring the legality of any particular economic
arrangement under the Clayton Act are to be less stringent than those
used in applying the Sherman Act.”213
Third, the Court reiterated that even in vertical mergers,
“[d]etermination of the relevant market is a necessary predicate to a
finding of a violation of the Clayton Act.”214 As revised, section 7 prohibits
only transactions whose effect “may be substantially to lessen
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly” in “any line of commerce
. . . in any section of the country.”215 The statute therefore requires a
plaintiff to define both “a product market (the ‘line of commerce’) and a
geographic market (the ‘section of the country’)” in which the
anticompetitive effects would be felt.216
Fourth, the Court determined that both economic and noneconomic
factors would determine whether the effect of the transaction “may be
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”217
The Court specifically identified three factors: (1) “the size of the share of
the market foreclosed”;218 (2) “the very nature and purpose of the
arrangement,”219 the latter of which it clarified to mean “the economic
purpose of[] the vertical arrangement”;220 and (3) “the trend toward

211

Id. at 324.

212

Id. at 323.

213

Id. at 328–29.

214

Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 324 (quoting United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 353 U.S. 586,
593 (1957)).
215

15 U.S.C. § 18.

216

Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 324.

217

15 U.S.C. § 18.

218

Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 328.

219

Id. at 329.

220

Id.; see also id. at 331 (“The importance which Congress attached to economic purpose is further demonstrated by the Senate and House Reports on H.R. 2734 . . . .”).
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concentration in the industry,” which it curiously interpreted to include
any “trend toward vertical integration.”221
The Court ultimately found that both economic and noneconomic
factors aligned against the merger of Brown Shoe and Kinney. Like the
district court, the Court concluded that the merger foreclosed what it
believed to be a significant share of the downstream market—“over 350
retail outlets,” or 1.2% of retail sales. It also concluded that the economic
purpose of the merger was to allow Brown Shoe to vertically integrate,
which it characterized as a form of tying—an offense per se unlawful at
the time.222 Finally, the court found “[t]he existence of a trend toward
vertical integration,” which in turn produced “a tendency of the acquiring
manufacturers to become increasingly important sources of supply for
their acquired outlets.”223 This vertical integration would result in “the
foreclosure of independent manufacturers from markets otherwise open
to them. . . . without producing any countervailing competitive,
economic, or social advantages.”224
From this mix of economic and noneconomic factors, the courts
gradually distilled a disjunctive legal test under which a plaintiff could
prevail if it showed that any of six factors—or more often, two or more
factors—was present.225 The Sixth Circuit formulated the definitive list in
1970, which the Eighth Circuit echoed two years later:
In dealing with vertical acquisitions under Section 7, as amended, the United States
Supreme Court has relied on several functional factors as indicia of the requisite anticompetitive effect: (1) foreclosing of the competitors of either party from a segment of the
market otherwise open to them; (2) the “nature and purpose” of the vertical arrangement;
(3) actual and reasonable likely adverse effects upon local industries and small business;

221

Id. at 332. Yet, as the D.C. Circuit observed many years later, “vertical mergers produce no
immediate change in the relevant market share.” United States v. AT&T Corp., 916 F.3d 1029, 1032
(D.C. Cir. 2019).
222 Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 332 (“[I]t is apparent both from past behavior of Brown and from the
testimony of Brown’s President, that Brown would use its ownership of Kinney to force Brown shoes
into Kinney stores. Thus, in operation this vertical arrangement would be quite analogous to one involving a tying clause.”).

The Court also relied upon a tying theory in a subsequent case, Ford Motor Co. v. United
States, 405 U.S. 562, 568–69 (1972) (“[The district court concluded that] Ford’s acquisition of the Autolite assets, particularly when viewed in the context of the original equipment (OE) tie and of GM’s
ownership of AC, has the result of transmitting the rigidity of the oligopolistic structure of the automobile industry to the spark plug industry . . . . We see no answer to that conclusion if the letter and
spirit of the Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act are to be honored.”).
223

Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 332.

224

Id. at 332, 334.

225

The development of this legal test mirrors the development of the law of vertical restraints,
particularly tying and exclusive dealing, during this era.
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(4) the level and trend of concentration in the market shares of the participating
companies, including any trend towards domination by a few leaders; (5) the existence of
a trend towards vertical integration and consolidation in previously independent
industries; and (6) the ease with which potential entrants may readily overcome barriers
226
to full entry and compete effectively with existing companies.

In contrast, the DOJ limited its enforcement decisions to two
economic factors: market shares and entry barriers.227 Reflecting the times
and particularly the paltry market shares involved in cases like Brown Shoe,
the DOJ set its enforcement thresholds quite low. It announced: “[T]he
department will ordinarily challenge a merger or series of mergers
between a supplying firm, accounting for approximately 10% or more of
the sales in its market, and one or more purchasing firms, accounting in
toto for approximately 6% or more of the total purchases in that
market.”228
The courts, however, initially declined to limit their analysis to
economic factors or misapplied the economic factors when they did
consider them.229 The FTC’s cement enforcement program illustrates both
approaches. In one case, U.S. Steel Corp. v. FTC,230 the Sixth Circuit
enforced an FTC administrative order after finding that all six vertical
merger factors were present.231 The court was particularly concerned that
the integration by merger of the upstream cement supplier (U.S. Steel
subsidiary U.A.C.) and the downstream cement distributor “ha[d] decisive
cost advantages over non-integrated competitors.”232 The court explained
that “[v]ertical integration creates a more assured level of plant utilization,
an elimination of any significant sales and marketing expenses to ones’
226

U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 426 F.2d 592, 599 (6th Cir. 1970); see also Miss. River
Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 454 F.2d 1083, 1091 (8th Cir. 1972) (listing the same six factors).
227 See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 182, at 10 (“[T]he Department attaches primary significance
to (i) the market share of the supplying firm, (ii) the market share of the purchasing firm or firms, and
(iii) the conditions of entry in the purchasing firm’s market.”).
228

Id.

229

Although in keeping with some of the economics of the day, the Supreme Court’s decision in
FTC v. Consol. Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965), is a special case within the vertical merger jurisprudence because it relied upon a theory—reciprocal buying—that has not been viewed as anticompetitive for many years. See id. at 594 (“We hold at the outset that the ‘reciprocity’ made possible by such
an acquisition is one of the congeries of anticompetitive practices at which the antitrust laws are
aimed.”); see also Edward D. Cavanagh, Reciprocal Dealing: A Rebirth?, 75 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 633, 635
(2001) (In the 1970s, “[t]he Antitrust Division ceased initiating reciprocity cases. At about the same
time, reciprocity as a theory of antitrust wrongdoing also came under heavy attack from antitrust
scholars and, until recently, has remained largely dormant.”).
230

426 F.2d 592 (6th Cir. 1970).

231

See id. at 599.

232

Id. at 603.
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own ready-mix subsidiary, and the ability to integrate the storage and
distribution facilities of the cement and ready-mix company into a single
urban terminal.”233 Even worse (at least in the court’s view), these dynamics
“forced [rivals] to expand or shift their sales territories to areas where there
was less vertical integration because of the competitive forces in vertically
integrating markets,”234 and “at least one” rival was forced to vertically
integrate itself to meet the competition.235 It therefore found “very
substantial evidence for each of the Commission’s findings that the ability
[of ] non-integrated cement producers (to compete) may be substantially
impaired,” the merging parties “may have achieved a decisive competitive
advantage over its competitors,” and the “trend towards vertical
[integration] in the production and sale of cement and concrete has been
aggravated” by the merger.236 For all these reasons, the court concluded
that the merger violated section 7.
The Eighth Circuit repeated this approach two years later when it
enforced an FTC administrative order in a second cement case, Mississippi
River Corp. v. FTC.237 In that case, a series of vertical mergers foreclosed
between 1.3% and 3.7% of the downstream market for ready-mix concrete
in several midwestern cities.238 The FTC—and subsequently the Eighth
Circuit—found these mergers anticompetitive239 in part because they had
an “immediate[]” and “adverse” impact on a rival local business.240
Ironically, however, the local business there was U.S. Steel, which, fresh
off its loss to the FTC in the Sixth Circuit, “was forced to close a Cincinnati
terminal in 1967 after three years of operation because of the loss of [one
of the acquired distributor’s] business.”241
The FTC was not alone in this quest. For example, in United States v.
Ford Motor Co.,242 the DOJ sought, a district court granted, and the

233

Id. at 603.

234

Id. at 601–02.

235

Id. at 602 (“The [FTC Hearing] Examiner specifically found that at least one of the vertical
acquisitions in the industry was caused, in part, by U.A.C.’s acquisition of Certified.”).
236

U.S. Steel Corp., 426 F.2d at 604 (internal quotations omitted).

237

454 F.2d 1083 (8th Cir. 1972).

238

See id. at 1091.

239

Downstream market shares were disputed, with the defendant arguing the shares amounted
to 1.3 to 3.7 percent and the Commission fixing the figure at 25 percent. The court punted, finding
“the foreclosure by Mississippi to fall into the prohibited zone even if the wider market lines were to
be drawn.” Id.
240

Id. at 1092.

241

Id.

242

405 U.S. 562 (1972).
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Supreme Court affirmed a divestiture order on a mix of both social and
economic grounds.243 In addition to unwinding the consummated vertical
merger, the remedy also required Ford to include provisions in the
divestiture sale that would “protect” the workers at the divested factory
from job or wage cuts for several years.244
The underlying tension between economic and noneconomic factors
broke in 1979, when the Second Circuit concluded that section 7 did not
condemn procompetitive vertical mergers. The case, Fruehauf Corp. v.
FTC,245 involved the vertical merger of Fruehauf, a truck trailer
manufacturer, with Kelsey, an upstream manufacturer of truck parts. The
FTC condemned the merger on two grounds: (1) the transaction
foreclosed rival input suppliers from Fruehauf’s demand, which
amounted to about five percent of the market, and (2) if a parts shortage
arose, the merger would allow Fruehauf preferential access to those
supplies.246
The Second Circuit disagreed; it explained that “[a] vertical merger,
unlike a horizontal one, does not eliminate a competing buyer or seller
from the market . . . does not, therefore, automatically have an
anticompetitive effect . . . or reduce competition,” and “may even operate
to increase competition.”247 Although the Second Circuit believed du Pont
and Brown Shoe occasionally “appear[] to encourage” a legal rule
proscribing “any vertical foreclosure,” it concluded that “[t]he Supreme
Court’s insistence . . . that the Clayton Act protects ‘competition, not
competitors,’ contravenes the notion that a significant level of foreclosure
is itself the proscribed effect.”248 The court explained:
[W]e are unwilling to assume that any vertical foreclosure lessens competition. Absent
very high market concentration or some other factor threatening a tangible
anticompetitive effect, a vertical merger may simply realign sales patterns . . . [and] free
up that much of the market . . . for new transactions between the merged firm’s
249
competitors and the merging firm’s competitors.

243

See id. at 571, 575.

244

See id. at 572 (affirming remedial provisions designed to “protect[] New Fostoria, the town
where the Autolite plant is located” and “protect[] employees of the New Fostoria plant by ordering
Ford to condition its divestiture sale on the purchaser’s assuming the existing wage and pension obligations”).
245

603 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1979).

246

See id. at 349.

247

Id. at 351–52.

248

Id. at 352, 352 n.9.

249

Id. at 352 n.9.
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The Second Circuit concluded that “[a] showing of some probable
anticompetitive impact is still essential,”250 and the Commission’s case
rested upon evidence “too ephemeral to sustain [its] decision.”251
B. The Consent Era (1980–2017)
The FTC’s loss in Fruehauf ended the era of aggressive—and
sometimes economically irrational—vertical merger enforcement. With
the Agencies burdened by the requirement to demonstrate that a vertical
merger would cause anticompetitive effects, not merely foreclosure,
vertical merger litigation became more difficult.
This change in the legal regime was coupled with new agency
leadership steeped in the new economic learning on vertical integration.
At the DOJ, Bill Baxter withdrew the 1968 Guidelines, replacing them with
both the 1982 Horizontal Merger Guidelines and the 1984 Non-Horizontal
Merger Guidelines. Economist Jim Miller initiated similar changes as FTC
Chairman.
Assistant Attorney General Baxter’s 1984 Non-Horizontal Merger
Guidelines were particularly important. The Guidelines began by
recognizing the same foundational concept the Second Circuit identified
in Fruehauf: “non-horizontal mergers”—and particularly vertical
mergers—“are less likely than horizontal mergers to create competitive
problems.”252
The Guidelines therefore abandoned three core features of earlier
cases. First, eschewing the amorphous and easily satisfied six-factor test,
the Division instead developed separate legal tests for three different
vertical theories of harm, when a vertical merger may (1) increase barriers
to entry; (2) facilitate collusion; or (3) allow a regulated entity to evade rate
regulation.253 Second, the Division abandoned the share thresholds it had
set in 1968 (and the even lower thresholds endorsed in Brown Shoe and
other cases), announcing that it was “unlikely to challenge a merger” that
may increase barriers to entry or facilitate collusion “unless overall
concentration of the upstream market is above 1800 HHI.”254 Third, the
Guidelines emphatically rejected the view—as expressed, for example, in
U.S. Steel—that efficiencies produced by vertical integration were

250

Id. at 353.

251

Fruehauf, 603 F.2d at 360.

252

DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 24.

253

See id. at 30–32.

254

Id. at 31–32.
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necessarily anticompetitive because they harmed competitors. Instead,
the Guidelines stated that “[t]he primary benefit of mergers to the
economy is their efficiency-enhancing potential, which can increase the
competitiveness of firms and result in lower prices to consumers.”255
Therefore “[a]n extensive pattern of vertical integration may constitute
evidence that substantial economies are afforded by vertical integration”
and consequently the Division “will give relatively more weight to
expected efficiencies in determining whether to challenge a vertical
merger than in determining whether to challenge a horizontal merger.”256
The Division was not alone; many leading scholars and policymakers
recognized that vertical mergers were inherently more likely to generate
efficiencies—and inherently less likely to harm competition—than their
horizontal counterparts.257 This remains the near-consensus view today.258
Updates to critical inputs (law and economics) significantly affected
the Agencies’ outputs (enforcement decisions). As Steven Salop noted
recently, the Commission has not litigated a purely vertical case since
Fruehauf.259 Similarly, until AT&T, the Division had not litigated a vertical
merger to a decision since 1977.260
Instead, the Agencies shifted to resolving vertical concerns through
consent agreements.261 Most of the time, the Agencies accepted a slate of
standard behavioral remedies—for example firewalls, nondiscrimination
requirements, and licensing obligations.262 A minority (perhaps 20%–25%)

255

Id. at 23 (applicable to horizontal mergers); see also id. at 32 (endorsing the view that the efficiencies applicable to horizontal transactions equally apply to vertical mergers).
256

Id. at 32.

257

See Fisher & Sciacca, supra note 183, at 39.

258

See, e.g., Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC v. FCC, 717 F.3d 982, 990 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Kavanaugh,
J., concurring) (noting that, in general, “vertical integration and vertical contracts are procompetitive”);
Nat’l Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 468 F.3d 831, 840 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(“[V]ertical integration creates efficiencies for consumers.”); Hoffman, supra note 5, at 4 (noting the
“broad consensus in competition policy and economic theory that the majority of vertical mergers are
beneficial because they reduce costs and increase the intensity of interbrand competition”); Salop &
Culley, supra note 14, at 15 (“[M]ost vertical mergers do not raise competitive concerns and likely are
procompetitive.”).
259

See Salop, supra note 14, at 1964 (“The last vertical merger case litigated to conclusion by the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) dates back to 1979, which the FTC lost because it was unable to
prove probable anticompetitive effects.” (citing Fruehauf Corp. v. FTC, 603 F.2d 345, 352–53 (2d Cir.
1979))).
260

See United States v. Hammermill Paper Co., 429 F. Supp. 1271, 1278 (W.D. Pa. 1977).

261

For a helpful summary, see Salop & Culley, supra note 131.

262

See, e.g., United States v. Sprint Corp., No. 95-1304, 1995 WL 819147 (D.D.C. 1995) (acknowledging both firewall and non-discrimination requirements); In re Merck & Co., Inc., FTC Docket No.
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of these consents required the divestiture of a vertically related subsidiary,
asset, or contract.263
Of course, not all vertical mergers required consents. For example, in
the early 2000s the FTC analyzed two facially similar vertical mergers, (1)
Cytyc’s acquisition of Digene and (2) Synopsis’ acquisition of Avant!.264 The
former involved the merger of two “complementary cervical cancer
screening tests,” whereas the latter involved the merger of two
“complementary integrated circuit design software products.”265 The
Commission found that Cytyc would have the ability and incentive to
harm rivals with relatively few countervailing efficiencies.266 In contrast,
the Commission found that Synopsis had little incentive to impede
interoperability with its upstream rivals and would realize significant
efficiencies from the transaction.267 Without divulging specifics, thenChairman Tim Muris also intimated that customers generally supported
the merger of Synopsis and Avant!.268 Given these different fact patterns,
the Commission chose to challenge the merger of Cytyc and Digene
(which was subsequently abandoned) and clear the merger of Synopsis and
Avant! without conditions.
On the other end of the spectrum, the Agencies have on occasion
required unusual behavioral remedies.269 Some, particularly during
President Obama’s first term, resembled sectoral regulations. For
example, the DOJ’s consent decree resolving Comcast’s acquisition of
NBCU imposed a duty to deal with rivals, arbitrate disputes over the terms
of dealing, and agree to net neutrality rules.270 Others, such as the FTC’s

C-3853 (Feb. 18, 1999) (including both firewall and nondiscrimination requirements); In re Raytheon
Co., FTC Docket No. C-3681 (Sept. 3, 1996) (discussing firewall requirements).
263

See, e.g., United States v. United Techs. Corp., 946 F. Supp. 2d 135, 140 (D.D.C. 2013) (discussing
divestiture of shares in a joint venture and obligation to divest, upon request, select assets); In re Dominion Res., Inc. & Consol. Nat. Gas Co., FTC Docket No. C-3901 (Nov. 4, 1999) (discussing divestiture
of one downstream subsidiary); In re TRW, Inc., FTC Docket No. C-3790 (Apr. 6, 1998) (discussing
divestiture of a contract).
264

See Timothy J. Muris, Principles for a Successful Competition Agency, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 165, 184–
86 (2005) (providing a contemporaneous comparison of the two matters).
265

Id. at 185.

266

See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Seeks to Block Cytyc Corp.’s Acquisition of Digene
Corp. (June 24, 2002), https://perma.cc/AQN7-WKQN.
267

See Muris, supra note 264, at 185–86.

268

See id.

269

See Wilson & Klovers, supra note 15, at 2.

270

See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., Justice Department Allows ComcastNBCU Joint Venture to Proceed with Conditions (Jan. 18, 2011), https://perma.cc/CE97-9694 (“The
Department of Justice announced today a settlement with Comcast Corp. and General Electric Co.’s
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consent order in Bosch’s acquisition of SPX, imposed compulsory royaltyfree patent licensing regimes.271
C. Recent Developments (Post-2017)
After almost forty years without a litigated vertical merger challenge,
the DOJ finally broke the streak in 2017. In United States v. AT&T Inc., the
Division alleged that the vertical merger of AT&T and Time Warner—two
firms in the cable industry—would allow the combined firm to raise rivals’
costs of a critical input: cable programming.272 After the DOJ filed suit, the
parties issued irrevocable offers to arbitrate program carriage disputes,
thereby removing AT&T’s ability—if not incentive—to raise rivals’ costs
(or completely foreclose rivals).273 On this basis, the district court found
the merger did not violate section 7 because it did not risk any
anticompetitive effects but did promise procompetitive efficiencies.274
While the case identified both procompetitive and anticompetitive
justifications for mergers, it did not break new ground in thinking about
weighing these effects.
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit took the opportunity to restate and clarify
the basic legal rules that apply to vertical mergers. Citing Brown Shoe, the
district court noted that “the government must show that the proposed
merger is likely to substantially lessen competition, which encompasses a
concept of ‘reasonable probability.’”275 It also noted that “[n]either the
government nor the defendants challenge application of the burdenshifting framework”276 used in United States v. Baker Hughes,277 under which
the plaintiff bears the initial burden to establish a prima facie case, which
the defendant may rebut.278 However, “unlike horizontal mergers,” the
court explained that “the government cannot use a short cut to establish
a presumption of anticompetitive effect through statistics about the
change in market concentration, because vertical mergers produce no

subsidiary NBC Universal Inc. (NBCU) that allows their joint venture to proceed conditioned on the
parties’ agreement to license programming to online competitors to Comcast’s cable TV services, subject themselves to anti-retaliation provisions and adhere to Open Internet requirements.”).
271

See In re Robert Bosch GmbH, FTC Docket No. C-4377, at 13 (Apr. 23, 2013).

272

United States v. AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d 1029, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 2019).

273

See id. at 1031.

274

See id. at 1037, 1041.

275

Id. at 1032.

276

Id.

277

908 F.2d 981, 982–83 (D.C. Cir. 1980).

278

See AT&T, 916 F.3d at 1032.
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immediate change in the relevant market share.”279 Rather, “the
government must make a ‘fact-specific showing’ that the proposed merger
is ‘likely to be anticompetitive.’”280 The D.C. Circuit found neither clear
error in the district court’s findings of fact nor abuse of discretion in its
decision to deny injunctive relief, and therefore it affirmed the district
court’s judgment.281
Most recently, the Agencies issued new Vertical Merger Guidelines.282
A draft version of the Guidelines was extensively debated publicly and
criticized as either too permissive or too stringent,283 while two FTC
commissioners opposed the final Guidelines in part because they saw the
document as overly accepting of EDM.284 From a purely historical
perspective, two changes stand out. First, the Vertical Merger Guidelines
endorse the “raising rivals’ cost” theory originally developed by Steve Salop
and David Scheffman in the early 1980s and supported by others following
the 1984 Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines and pre-AT&T cases.285
Second, the Vertical Merger Guidelines substantially expand—at least
relative to the spartan 1984 Guidelines—the discussion of procompetitive
effects,286 albeit with some new qualifications.287
Although the economics has radically changed since Brown Shoe and
the FTC’s cement cases, these precedents remain on the books. And while
279 Id. at 1032. (citing the 1984 Guidelines, albeit erroneously indicating that the document was
authored jointly by both the DOJ and the FTC).
280

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

281

See id. at 1032, 1047.

282

See DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 3.

283

Compare Baker et al., supra note 38, at 18, (“[T]he dVMGs do not suggest applying any anticompetitive presumptions to the most worrisome market structures . . . [raising] concerns that the
final VMGs could be biased toward under-enforcement.”), with Chamber of Commerce of the United
States of America, Comment Letter on the Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines, at 1 (Feb. 14, 2020),
https://perma.cc/893M-NN9R (“We do, however, have some comments and concerns about the draft
Guidelines, as discussed below. Vertical mergers are a central element of efficient business organization, and they have been—for good reason—an infrequent subject of antitrust enforcement. It is important that the Guidelines avoid articulating policies that could, even unintentionally, unduly impede efficient mergers.”).
284 See Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Rohit Chopra, Regarding the Publication of Vertical Merger Guidelines, No. P810034, at 6 (June 30, 2020), https://perma.cc/9G8P-YZNR; Dissenting
Statement of Commissioner Rebecca Kelly Slaughter, In re FTC-DOJ Vertical Merger Guidelines, No.
P810034, at 4 (June 30, 2020), https://perma.cc/6RUK-H5UR.
285

See, e.g., Salop & Scheffman, supra note 108.

286

See DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 3, at 11–12.

287

For example, the Guidelines note in an example that technological incompatibility may imply
that a “merger is unlikely to generate any benefits due to the elimination of double marginalization.”
Id. at 10.
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Fruehauf and now AT&T provide more economically sound counterpoints,
vertical merger law remains relatively undeveloped as compared to
horizontal merger law. Therefore, as courts embrace the Agencies’
guidelines as part of caselaw development,288 it is critically important that
courts understand both the underlying economic principles and their
legal implications for vertical mergers.
III. Proposed Legal Framework
We join the chorus who agree with the burden-shifting framework
applied by the D.C. Circuit in AT&T.289 Yet unlike many commentators, we
believe RRC and EDM theories are so “inextricably linked”—to borrow a
phrase from the Horizontal Merger Guidelines290—that a plaintiff alleging
an RRC theory must also demonstrate that the likely anticompetitive
harm of RRC exceeds the likely procompetitive benefits of EDM. We also
identify a few practical impediments to a full-blown Baker Hughes analysis.
A. The Burden-Shifting Framework
In United States v. AT&T Inc., the court applied the burden-shifting
framework announced in United States v. Baker Hughes, which has been
used in the horizontal merger context, to the vertical merger context. The
Baker Hughes formulation for a burden shift focuses on certain horizontal
presumptions based on market shares. As articulated in FTC v. H.J. Heinz
Co.,291 the formulation works as follows:
First the government must show that the merger would produce a firm controlling an
undue percentage share of the relevant market, and [would] result[] in a significant
increase in the concentration of firms in that market. Such a showing establishes a
presumption that the merger will substantially lessen competition. To rebut the
presumption, the defendants must produce evidence that show[s] that the market-share
statistics [give] an inaccurate account of the [merger’s] probable effects on competition in
the relevant market. If the defendant successfully rebuts the presumption [of illegality],
the burden of producing additional evidence of anticompetitive effect shifts to the
government, and merges with the ultimate burden of persuasion, which remains with the
292
government at all times.

288 See Hillary Greene & D. Daniel Sokol, Judicial Treatment of the Antitrust Treatise, 100 IOWA L.
REV. 2039, 2056 (2015).
289 See, e.g., Jonathan M. Jacobson, Vertical Mergers: Is It Time to Move the Ball?, 33 ANTITRUST 6,
6, 10 (2019).
290

DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 31, at 30 n.14.

291

246 F.3d 708 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

292

Id. at 715 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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A burden-shifting framework is applicable in the vertical merger
context with certain important modifications. The primary modification
is the need to account for the significant differences between vertical and
horizontal mergers. First and foremost, as the court noted in AT&T,
vertical mergers do not eliminate a competitor.293 Vertical mergers
therefore lack the primary means of competitive harm found in horizontal
merger cases and for this reason should be—all else equal—less likely to
produce anticompetitive effects than horizontal mergers.294 Second,
unlike horizontal mergers, vertical mergers enhance vertical integration,
thereby generating both efficiencies and EDM. Thus, they may be more
likely to produce procompetitive effects.295
1.

Plaintiff’s Prima Facie Case

In the initial stage of the inquiry and consistent with much of the
theoretical and empirical literature, a vertical merger should be presumed
lawful. A plaintiff bears the burden of rebutting this presumption by
demonstrating that the merger is likely to cause a net anticompetitive
effect in a relevant antitrust market. This approach is also required by the
statute, which proscribes only those mergers—whether horizontal or
vertical—that the plaintiff can prove “may be substantially to lessen
competition.”296
As the Vertical Merger Guidelines recognize, plaintiffs today rely
primarily upon either an RRC theory, a complete foreclosure theory, or
both. Yet the economics literature demonstrates that a merger that allows
the parties to raise their rivals’ costs also typically allows them to eliminate
a double margin—hence, an EDM-RRC tradeoff.297 Indeed, these two
effects are essentially two sides of the same coin, just that one effect is

293

See United States v. AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d 1029, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 2019).

294

See Guidelines on the Assessment of Non-Horizontal Mergers Under the Council Regulation on the
Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, 265 OFFICIAL J. EUR. UNION 6, 7 (Oct. 18, 2008),
https://perma.cc/9RD9-E4C3 [hereinafter Guidelines] (“Non-horizontal mergers are generally less
likely to significantly impede effective competition than horizontal mergers.”); U.K. Competition
Comm’n, Off. of Fair Trading, Merger Assessment Guidelines, CC2 (Revised)/OFT1254, at 49 (2010),
https://perma.cc/Q7BK-WR3U (“[I]t is a well-established principle that most are benign and do not
raise competition concerns.”).
295 See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 140, ¶ 1040a (“[T]he statutory and economic case for
an efficiency defense is as strong or stronger for vertical mergers as for horizontal ones.”).
296

15 U.S.C. § 18.

297

See supra Part I.
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positive (procompetitive) and the other is negative (anticompetitive).298 Yet
like matter and antimatter, the two effects are not necessarily always equal
in magnitude;299 in most circumstances, the economic literature suggests
that the procompetitive benefits of vertical mergers—including EDM—
will be greater than any anticompetitive effects.300
Therefore, if a plaintiff brings an RRC case, it should be able to rebut
the presumption of lawfulness and establish its prima facie case only if it
can prove both that the merger is likely to raise rivals’ costs and that this
anticompetitive effect is probably greater than the likely offsetting
procompetitive effect generated by EDM. We believe we are the first to
argue that the plaintiff should account for EDM as part of its prima facie
case.301 In cases such as AT&T, the plaintiff may fail to prove RRC harm in
the first place. In cases such as the 1970s-era cement cases (if they were
decided today), the plaintiff may establish some anticompetitive effect
associated with RRC but fail to demonstrate that these effects are greater
than the offsetting procompetitive effects of EDM.
We see no reason why the same test should not apply to allegations of
complete foreclosure. From an economic perspective, the incidence of
EDM—a unilateral and essentially automatic effect—should not depend
upon whether the combined firm decides to cut off rivals entirely or
merely raise the price it charges them.302 Others seem to agree; for
example, the EC non-horizontal merger guidelines (“ENHMG”) identify
both the potential for foreclosure as well as limits to EDM and the
assumptions behind those limits.303
The question remains: How does a plaintiff carry the burden to
address both sides of the vertical-merger coin (RRC and EDM)? Some
298 See, e.g., Christine S. Wilson, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks on Reflections on the
2020 Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines and Comments from Stakeholders at the DOJ Workshop on
Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines 6–7 (Mar. 11, 2020), https://perma.cc/C92U-UMMG.
299

See, e.g., Marco Gersabeck, Why Is There More Matter Than Antimatter?, SCI. AM. (Mar. 21, 2019),
https://perma.cc/2JE6-B73B.
300

See supra notes 27–29.

301

Though some have come close. See, e.g., Kenneth Edelson & Jonathan Jacobson, Comment
Letter on the Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines, at 3 (Feb. 4, 2020), https://perma.cc/5VCT-KG4T (“Our
own view is that this efficiency is pervasive and significant in vertical mergers. The defense should
therefore bear only a burden of producing evidence, and the agencies should bear the burden of disproving the significance of EDM where shown to exist. This would depart from the typical standard
in a merger case, under which defendants must prove the reality, magnitude, and merger-specific
character of the claimed efficiencies.”).
302 See Salinger, supra note 128, at 354–55 (describing a model in which EDM may or may not
dominate effects from foreclosure resulting from the vertical merger).
303

See Guidelines, supra note 294, at 12, 15.
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economists have tackled this question by suggesting merger simulation
may be sufficient.304 In contrast, the European Commission (“EC”) has
suggested a more qualitative approach:
In its assessment of the likely incentives of the merged firm, the Commission may take
into account various considerations such as the ownership structure of the merged entity,
the type of strategies adopted on the market in the past or the content of internal strategic
305
documents such as business plans.

In the next paragraph, the ENHMG add “the Commission examines
both the incentives to adopt such conduct and the factors liable to reduce,
or even eliminate, those incentives, including the possibility that the
conduct is unlawful.”306 How the EC could convert this qualitative analysis
into a quantitative balancing test remains unclear.307 Understanding
particular economic mechanisms is important, and we may have greater
confidence in the explanatory power of a given model if its prediction
aligns with other evidence, such as unequivocal internal documents.
Assuming a quantitative economic analysis is necessary, a reviewing
court or agency must compare one estimate—the projected harms—to
another—the projected benefits. Although this analysis is necessarily
probabilistic (e.g., confidence intervals may suggest a ninety percent
likelihood that a given transaction is net procompetitive), some inferences
can be drawn from market structure. For example, if the upstream and
downstream markets are highly competitive, then the anticompetitive
harms are likely to be both (1) negligible and (2) smaller than the
procompetitive benefits (including efficiencies assessed in the second
step).308 Likewise, if the upstream and downstream markets are both
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See supra Part I (discussing Das Varma et al. and other papers).
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Guidelines, supra note 294, at 13 (citations omitted).
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Id. at 14.
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See id. 18, 18 n.1 (recognizing counterstrategies by other firms and citing Case
COMP/M.1879 — Boeing/Hughes (2000)).
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See Transcript of Federal Trade Commission: Competition and Consumer Protection in the
21st Century, at 14 (Nov. 1, 2018), https://perma.cc/RG2M-FH2K (statement of Prof. Steven Salop)
(“But to start, by way of introduction, the key points I want to make are listed on the slide. That vertical
mergers should be focused on oligopoly markets. A lot [of ] the criticisms one hears about vertical
merger enforcement, why vertical mergers are competitive[,] relate to vertical mergers in either perfect monopoly or perfectly competitive markets.”); id. at 19 (statement of Prof. Steven Salop) (“I think
where there may be controversy is what is in the green font, which are my views, that enforcement
should be focused on oligopoly markets, that only cognizable efficiencies should be credited, and that
what you need to do is analyze the overall effect on consumers, using a fact-based analysis of both
harms and efficiencies.”); id. at 116 (statement of Bruce Hoffman) (“So we need to update—I think
Steve is right on target in focusing on oligopoly markets.”); id. at 141 (statement of Paul Yde) (advocating for “a page” of Guidelines that says “we are only going to look at vertical transactions where we are
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monopolized, then the merger will eliminate double marginalization and
foreclose zero firms (because there are no other firms in either market), so
the transaction is likely procompetitive.
Between these outcomes lies most of the real world. Many upstream
and downstream markets are imperfectly competitive (i.e., oligopolistic or
monopolistically competitive). In those instances, the dominant
tendency—procompetitive or anticompetitive—of a merger may be less
clear, unlike in the horizontal context where the likelihood of
anticompetitive effects increases, all else equal, as the level of
concentration in the market increases.309 The cases with unclear vertical
effects are the ones where it will be important for the plaintiff to prove
that the merger “may [] substantially lessen competition”310 by
demonstrating that the harm from RRC likely exceeds the benefits of
EDM.
2.

Defendant’s Rebuttal

If the plaintiff makes the requisite showing (after accounting for any
contrary arguments about RRC or EDM made by the defendant), then the
burden shifts to the defendant, who must demonstrate that the
transaction is net procompetitive.311 With the RRC-EDM doppelgänger
already decided, the rebuttal argument will be limited to traditional
efficiencies.312
A number of former agency officials argue that most, if not all, of the
procompetitive effects of vertical mergers, can be achieved by contract.313

confident that we are looking at an oligopoly at both stages”); id. at 154 (statement of Gene Kimmelman) (describing “oligopolistic markets” as the ones “where we have substantial concerns”).
309

See supra notes 153, 157–159 and accompanying text.
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15 U.S.C. § 18.
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There is some disagreement about whether the burden is one of proof or persuasion. See Jacobson, supra note 289, at 10 (“There are steep differences, however, concerning step 2. Philadelphia
National Bank has long been understood as saying that the defendant’s burden under step 2—i.e., after
an anticompetitive effect has been established—is one of proof. Baker Hughes, however, states that the
burden is one of production, not proof, which is consistent with the Supreme Court’s recent decision
in Ohio v. American Express in the context of the rule of reason under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.”).
312
313

See, e.g., supra Section I.A.2.

See, e.g., Baker et al., supra note 38, at 31 (“We also want to comment on the common assumptions that EDM merger benefits are inevitable, that a failure to achieve EDM benefits in the premerger
market is sufficient proof that EDM would occur post-merger, and that EDM can be presumed to be
merger-specific and otherwise cognizable. Economic reasoning does not support these assumptions
and, therefore, we recommend that the final VMGs should make the point that they would be unwarranted.”); see also Baker et al., supra note 4, at 15 (arguing that “EDM might be eliminated through
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Yet this view is not consistent with much of the theoretical economic
literature, let alone much of the empirical work across economics,
management, and operations literatures.314
General Motors’ (“GM”) acquisition of Fisher is perhaps the best
known real-world example of the limits of contractual mechanisms for
vertical integration.315 GM entered a ten-year requirements contract to
purchase all of its automotive bodies from Fisher, which was designed to
protect Fisher’s investment in new production facilities.316 As one might
expect from sophisticated parties, the contract also fixed a “cost plus”
price and included a most-favored nations clause.317 Yet GM quickly
became dissatisfied with the pricing terms and Fisher’s refusal to collocate
its production facilities.318 So GM sought to acquire Fisher, initiating the
process halfway through the contract and completing the transaction with
three years remaining on the original ten-year agreement.319 The example
demonstrates how, even when firms actually strike a contract and that
contract contains a fixed margin (approximately seventeen percent) and
provisions designed to prevent holdup, contracting can still be far less
efficient than vertically integrating by merger.
B. Practical Impediments
In practice, most cases will stand or fall on the plaintiff’s prima facie
case for three reasons. First, the Agencies rarely credit defendant’s
proffered efficiencies.320 Therefore, if an agency believes RRC likely
exceeds EDM, that conclusion is usually sufficient to prompt a challenge.
And because vertical merger litigation is incredibly rare, the vast majority
of challenged vertical mergers are either abandoned or settled, making the
agency merger review process the first and last step in the analysis.

negotiation of vertical contracts between independent firms” and listing a long set of circumstances—
from various kinds of vertical contracts to the purported failure of not having “considered contracting” premerger at all).
314

See O’Brien, supra note 41 and accompanying text (describing empirical literature on the efficacy of vertical contracts to achieve procompetitive effects of integration).
315 See Klein et al., supra note 8, at 308–10; see also Benjamin Klein, Vertical Integration as Organizational Ownership: The Fisher Body-General Motors Relationship Revisited, 4 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 199
(1988).
316

See Klein et al., supra note 8, at 308.
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Id. at 309.
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Id. at 310.

320

See Coate & Heimert, supra note 148 and accompanying text.
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Second, although the courts have acknowledged vertical merger
efficiencies, vertical merger cases are rarely, if ever, decided on that basis.
For example, although the AT&T court applied the Baker Hughes burdenshifting framework, it stopped at the first step after finding the plaintiff
had failed to prove that the transaction would allow the merging parties
to raise rivals’ costs. The same was true in Fruehauf.321
Third and relatedly, as noted previously, the Agencies’ analysis of
efficiencies raises a “chicken and egg” problem.322 The Agencies frequently
discount efficiencies claims either heavily or entirely, arguing that the
merging parties have failed to substantiate and verify those claims.
Because the Agencies see few efficiencies stories that meet their standards,
they tend to approach efficiencies claims with significant skepticism.
Against this backdrop and because the burden of proving the existence
and magnitude of traditional efficiencies falls on the merging parties, the
parties seldom bother to collect the data necessary to make a successful
efficiencies defense. Solving this “chicken and egg” problem323 will require
the Agencies to identify the ways in which merging parties can enhance
their efficiencies advocacy and will require merging parties to invest the
requisite time and effort in collecting the data and information necessary
to satisfy the Agencies’ standards.
Conclusion
Vertical merger law and policy remain a work in progress. Economists
have long understood the benefits of vertical integration—including both
EDM and a bevy of traditional efficiencies. Yet the law has not always
followed the economics, and in a few infamous cases, the law has run
directly counter to it. Building upon modern economic literature, a nearconsensus holds that vertical—and other non-horizontal mergers—
typically present fewer competitive concerns than horizontal mergers. On
occasion, policymakers in the United States have taken this approach,
including in the 1984 Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines.
As the D.C. Circuit recognized in AT&T, courts and enforcers need an
administrable test that integrates near-consensus economic theory. The
321

See Fruehauf Corp. v. FTC, 603 F.2d 345, 353–361 (2d Cir. 1979).
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See Wilson, supra note 49.
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See, e.g., Christine S. Wilson, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks on Antitrust and Innovation: Still Not a Dynamic Duo? at the Standard Essential Patents Symposium, at 13–14 (Sept. 10,
2019), https://perma.cc/RP2Z-5UP2; see also Timothy J. Muris, Opening Remarks Before FTC Bureau
of Economics Roundtable on Understanding Mergers: Strategy and Planning, Implementation, and
Outcomes (Dec. 9, 2002), https://perma.cc/E6FM-BBZT.
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Baker Hughes burden-shifting framework is useful and should be retained.
At least until very recently, the discussion has missed the recognition that
EDM and RRC are inextricably linked (if not necessarily of the same
magnitude) and therefore must be assessed together in the first step. That
is, if a plaintiff alleges an RRC theory of harm in a vertical merger case,
then as part of its prima facie case, the plaintiff must also demonstrate
that the likely anticompetitive harm of RRC exceeds the likely
procompetitive benefits of EDM. In other words, the plaintiff needs to
grapple with the unilateral effects tradeoff. Many participants in today’s
vertical-merger discussion unduly discount the procompetitive benefits
that a defendant can show in the second step. Participants both ignore
some classes of efficiencies altogether and impose an unrealistic mergerspecificity requirement more stringent than the one used in horizontal
mergers. By doing so, the participants ignore or under-emphasize what we
term holistic efficiencies. We hope that this Article will facilitate further
dialogue and analysis of these issues in the near term, leading to a firmer
foundation for the treatment of vertical mergers by the Agencies and
courts in the future.

